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ABSTRACT 
Critical to the success of the homeland security mission is a robust Department of 
Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). During a speech 
made while signing the Homeland Security Appropriations Act for 2006, President 
George W. Bush stressed that in order to defend the United States from terrorists and 
criminals, the borders and interior of the country must be secured and immigration laws 
enforced. Unique to the authority found in ICE is the responsibility to carry out this 
mission. ICE can only accomplish this mission as an integrated and focused agency. 
However, evidence exists that ICE, which was created by the merger of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service and the Customs Service, has not integrated legacy 
workforces to produce an efficient and unified organization. The evidence suggests that a 
failed merger plan has left ICE with a segregated workforce that is dysfunctional in 
executing an enforcement strategy utilizing the blended workforce. This thesis examines 
and assesses the result of the merger and seeks to identify the causes of inefficiency in the 
current organization. The thesis recommends a course of action that will mitigate the 
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A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In March 2003, the Administration, under direction from Congress, merged 
various components of the now defunct U.S. Customs Service (Customs) and U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to create the U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE). They also transferred other components of these former 
agencies to form the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). ICE and CBP became 
part of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), initially within the Border and 
Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate.  
On July 12, 2005, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff announced a subsequent 
reorganization that eliminated BTS. Congress approved of this redesign with the passage 
of Public Law 109-901, which eliminated the Office of the Undersecretary for BTS and 
made ICE a direct report to the Secretary of DHS.2 Since the formation of ICE, however, 
reports produced by the DHS, Office of Inspector General3 (OIG), the Heritage 
Foundation, and the Center for Strategic Studies4 have challenged the effectiveness of 
ICE. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the source of ICE’s problems. In 
particular, the goal is to diagnose the critical reasons for the conflict, tension, 
inefficiency, and ineffectiveness that these and other outside observers have documented 
in ICE’s sole investigative component, its Office of Investigations (OI). At the core of 
this analysis is a focus on the ways in which the merger of the various components of  
                                                 
1 Stephen R. Viña, “Homeland Security: Scope of the Secretary’s Reorganization Authority,” CRS 
Report for Congress, RS21450, 9 August 2005 (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 2005), 6. 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/crs/nps21-111605-05.pdf (accessed 1 October 2006). 
2 Jennifer E. Lake and Blas Nuñez-Neto, “Homeland Security Department: FY2006 Appropriations,” 
CRS Report for Congress, RL32863, 24 January 2006 (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 2006), 
29. https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/crs/nps-27-020106-03.pdf (accessed 1 October 2006). 
3 Richard L. Skinner, An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection with 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
Inspector General, 2005), 100. 
4 James Jay Carfano and David Heyman, DHS 2.0 Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security, 
Heritage Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies Special Report (Washington, 
D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2004), 7. 
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ICE has failed, and to identify the critical paths of change and improvement that could, 
even now, greatly improve the essential mission of ICE for the nation’s homeland 
security.  
The mission given to ICE is unquestionably a priority for homeland security. In a 
speech made while signing the Homeland Security Appropriations Act for 2006, which 
allocated 7.5 billion dollars to combat illegal immigration, President George W. Bush 
stated: 
To defend this country, we’ve got to enforce our borders. When our 
borders are not secure, terrorists and drug dealers and criminals find it 
easier to come to America. This administration is going to work with 
Congress to make sure we do our job, and that starts with having a clear 
strategy. And here’s how the strategy has got to be: We’ve got to 
strengthen security along our borders to stop people from entering 
illegally. In other words, we’ve got to stop people from coming here in the 
first place. Secondly, we must improve our ability to find and apprehend 
illegal immigrants who have made it across the border. If somebody is 
here illegally, we’ve got to do everything we can to find him or her. And 
thirdly, we’ve got to work to ensure that those who are caught are returned 
to their home countries as soon as possible. The bill I sign today will 
provide critical resources for all these efforts.5  
ICE’s own mission statement clearly identifies its goal of protecting the nation 
through programs that were largely established by its legacy components. Current 
programs of an immigration enforcement nature pertain to critical infrastructure and 
worksite enforcement, human smuggling and trafficking, document and benefit fraud, 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces and violent street gang investigations. Current programs of a 
customs enforcement nature pertain to illegal export of technology and munitions, 
narcotic trafficking, cyber crimes, intellectual property rights and financial crime 
investigations. 
While the President’s charge is clear, the blending of legacy immigration and 
customs enforcement agencies has become problematic and threatens to undermine this 
clear national priority. Some of the most contentious debate has been caused by the 
blending of customs law enforcement (Title 19) functions and immigration law 
                                                 
5 George W. Bush, “President Signs Homeland Appropriations Act for 2006,” The White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051018-2.html (accessed 28 October 2006).  
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enforcement (Title 8) functions and distributing responsibilities for these enforcement 
disciplines to both ICE and its agency partner, CBP.  
Historically, customs enforcement revolved around commerce; immigration 
enforcement centered on people. The investigative functions of Customs and INS did not 
have overlapping or shared missions, and each developed different focuses and strategies 
to execute their respective missions. Relationships between various divisions within 
Customs and INS were well-integrated and complementary. With the merger, these clear 
lines of work and the strength of the internal relationships were disrupted and damaged. 
Before the merger, INS was structured around four operational areas: 
Enforcement, Detention and Removal (DRO), Inspections, and Adjudications. 
Enforcement was further divided into the uniformed Border Patrol (BP) and non-
uniformed Investigations (INV). The Border Patrol’s primary function was to interdict 
and prevent undocumented aliens6 (UDAs) from entering the United States. 
Investigations’ primary role was the enforcement of immigration law on the interior of 
the United States. DRO also had uniformed and non-uniformed personnel, whose primary 
function was to detain and remove aliens. Enforcement (BP and INV) had a strong 
symbiotic relationship with DRO. Inspections was primarily a uniformed service that 
inspected and admitted immigrants and non-immigrants into the United States through 
established ports of entry. Adjudications was primarily responsible for adjusting the 
status aliens to Lawful Permanent Resident Status and to naturalize immigrants.  
Legacy Customs had three operational elements: Customs Management Centers 
(CMC), Strategic Trade Centers (STC) and the Office of Investigations. The main 
component of the CMC involved the activities of Customs Inspectors, who were the 
uniformed officers located at ports of entry. The STC was a relatively small component 
in Customs. Their primary function pertained to international trade quotas that the United 
States imposed on certain goods. STC Auditors and Trade Specialists monitored, 
analyzed and assessed additional duties on imported goods that damaged certain domestic  
 
                                                 
6 Undocumented Alien (UDA) means any person not a citizen or national of the United States, present 
in the United States without having been inspected and lawfully admitted into the United States. 
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industries, such as steel. The primary function of the Office of Investigations (OI) was to 
investigate violations of customs law. OI had a strong symbiotic relationship with 
Customs Inspectors. 
Upon DHS’ creation, the functions of the CMC and STC from Customs were 
merged with the functions of Inspections and Border Patrol from INS into CBP. The 
functions of OI from Customs were merged with the functions of Investigations and DRO 
from INS into ICE. The symbiotic relationships that OI maintained with the CMC in 
Customs were strained by virtue that OI and CMC were in separate agencies. Likewise, 
the symbiotic relationships that Border Patrol maintained with DRO and INV, which 
existed in INS, were also now strained by their placement in separate agencies.  
President Bush and DHS Secretary Chertoff have stated that enforcement of the 
country’s immigration laws is the centerpiece of their homeland security strategy. 
However, as the merger of INS and Customs into ICE unfolded, problems associated 
with the enforcement of immigration enforcement and its expanded role in the national 
strategy to combat terrorism became increasingly problematic.  
The U.S. borders are porous. Millions of unknown foreign citizens (“aliens” under 
immigration law)7 enter the United States each year. For at least the last decade or two, 
illegal immigration has been seen as a security threat to the United States. After 9/11, 
immigration enforcement became a significant part of the homeland security strategy. 
The immigration enforcement mission given to ICE, however, is daunting. ICE 
Special Agents are the second largest federal contributor to the Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTF), second only to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Participating 
ICE agents on the JTTFs are largely comprised of former INS Special Agents. Their 
work accounts for approximately 80% of all arrests made by the JTTFs.8 Yet, a large 
number of trained immigration enforcement experts, transferred to ICE OI from INS, are 
                                                 
7 “Alien” means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.  This includes temporary 
visitors and lawful permanent residents.  Immigration and Nationality Act Section 101(a)(3), 8 United 
States Code Section 1101(a)(3). 
8 Unnamed, twenty-plus year employee of Immigration and Naturalization Service and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, currently holding a senior position within Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement with supervisory duties over Joint Terrorism Task Force assets, off-record interview with 
author, 12 December 2006. 
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leaving government prematurely with early retirements for private sector employment or 
transfers to DRO and other agencies.9 This loss of expertise threatens to weaken 
immigration enforcement at precisely the time the nation’s homeland security strategy 
calls for more involvement. If unchecked, this human capital loss has a high probability 
of threatening ICE’s ability to fulfill the centerpiece of the President’s homeland security 
strategy – immigration enforcement. Measures to ensure that new agents are being 
trained and developed to become the future immigration enforcement experts are also 
faltering under organizational inefficiencies and ineffectiveness.  
Consequences of ICE’s problems are readily apparent. Two Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) studies, for example, reveal that the majority of illegal aliens 
in U.S. federal and state prisons are serving sentences because of crimes unrelated to their 
immigration offense. In the federal prison system, 68% of all convicted illegal aliens are 
serving sentences for crimes other than immigration-related offenses. In the state prison 
system, 86% of all convicted illegal aliens are serving sentences for crimes other than 
immigration-related offenses. These non-immigration related crimes run the full gamut of 
criminal violations, the majority of which are serious violent felony and drug offenses.10 
In a population study of 55,322 incarcerated illegal aliens, the average illegal 
alien had been arrested over 8 times for a total of approximately 700,000 criminal 
offenses.11 Forty-nine percent of the illegal aliens had previous violent felony and drug 
offense convictions. Of those aliens arrested for only immigration-related charges, two-
thirds had prior criminal arrest records; and 56% of those charged with unlawful reentry 
had previous convictions for violent felonies.  
The impact on states is even greater. In Colorado, for instance, illegal aliens 
constitute approximately 5% of the state’s total population. Yet, 20% of the state’s total 
                                                 
9 A precise number of these transfers is difficult to document.  This observation is based upon 
discussions with senior agents and supervisors during the study’s research, from two SAC offices of which 
I have personal knowledge, and widespread reports from agents across the country. 
10 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Information on Certain Illegal Aliens Arrested in the United 
States, Briefing for Congressional Requesters, 19th Cong., 1st sess., 9 May 2005 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2005), 22-23. http://gao.gov/new.items/d05646r.pdf (accessed 28 October 
2005). 
11 Ibid., 3. 
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jail population is illegal aliens.12 Although a minority of illegal aliens intend to do 
Americans harm, there is no way to know in advance which illegal aliens are the 
criminals and terrorists. One in four fugitive murder warrants issued in Colorado are for 
illegal aliens, but in sheer numbers this pales in comparison to Los Angeles County 
where there are over 300 outstanding murder warrants for illegal aliens.13  
Although these statistics appear to be high, empirical analysis demonstrates that 
the likelihood of incarceration for foreign born males is lower than a similarly situated 
native born population. According to the Migration Policy Institute, based upon 2000 
census data “the incarceration rate of the US born (3.51 percent) was four times the rate 
of the foreign born (0.86 percent).”14  
Between 1995 and 2003, Dr. Robert J. Sampson conducted a study that identified 
the “Latino paradox.” The study contrasted the propensity towards violence by Hispanics 
to whites and blacks in 180 Chicago neighborhoods. According to Sampson: 
Surprisingly, we found a significantly lower rate of violence among 
Mexican-Americans than among black and whites. A major reason is that 
more than a quarter of all those of Mexican descent were born abroad and 
more than half lived in neighborhoods where the majority of residents 
were also Mexican. Indeed, the first-generation immigrants (those born 
outside the United States) in our study were 45 percent less likely to 
commit violence than were third-generation Americans, adjusting for 
family and neighborhood background. Second-generation immigrants 
were 22 percent less likely to commit violence than the third generation.15 
The significance of this issue is that the real security risk is the unknown illegal 
population, those who may provide the greatest vulnerability and link to terrorism 
because they are totally unscreened and unrecorded. To mitigate this vulnerability CBP 
and ICE have focused their efforts on this population. Illegal movement into the United 
                                                 
12 Colorado Alliance for Immigration Reform, Crime and Illegal Aliens in Colorado, 
http://www.cairco.org/issues/issues_crime_colorado.html (accessed 29 January 2006). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Rubén G. Rumbaut et al., “Debunking the Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among 
First- and Second-Generation Young Men,” Migration Policy Institute, 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=403 (accessed 28 January 2007). 
15 Robert J. Sampson, “Open Doors Don’t Invite Criminals,” New York Times, 11 March 2006, sec. 
A, p. 15. http://wjh.harvard.edu/soc/faculty/sampson/articles/2006_NYT_OpenDoors.pdf (accessed 28 
January 2007). 
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States is primarily a concern of CBP whose top priority is to secure the border and to 
keep terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States. This is done at ports of 
entry with uniformed CBP Officers and between ports of entry by Border Patrol Agents. 
Once in the interior of the United States, responsibility to respond to these threats shifts 
to ICE. A significant priority for ICE is to eliminate the potential threat of terrorist acts, 
by targeting people, money and materials that support terrorists. ICE largely executes 
their counterterrorism mission through participation in the JTTFs. Additionally, ICE has 
implemented several border and interior initiatives that target smuggling organizations. 
Smuggling organizations have resources that provide a significant threat to bring in and 
transit scores of unidentified aliens throughout the United States.  
B.  HYPOTHESIS 
The root cause for the failure to produce a cohesive and efficient organization is a 
direct consequence of an insufficient, even amateurish, effort of the change management 
process. This failure, in turn, underlies many of the problems facing ICE and, therefore, 
the nation’s ability to secure its borders. Even though the formation of DHS involved an 
organizational change management effort of historic proportions, ICE leadership 
systematically failed, and perhaps consciously undermined, efforts to bring immigration 
enforcement fully into the broad range of tasks required by Congressional and 
Administration directive. 
This thesis examines the process of organizational merger that transformed 
components from INS and Customs into a single entity within the Department of 
Homeland Security. It focuses specifically on identifying where and why the process 
failed in its goal to create one agency that would draw on the strengths of two disciplines 
(immigration and customs) to protect the homeland.  
The outcome of this thesis is a recommendation for the corrective action needed 
to forge a new organizational culture and enhance the operational efficiency of ICE. 
Although both immigration and customs enforcement have been deeply affected by the 
creation of ICE, the emphasis here is on the impact of organizational failures on 
immigration enforcement, which as noted above rests solidly as the centerpiece of the 
President’s homeland security strategy.  
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1. Identifying Organizational Problems 
Reports from the DHS’ OIG and by non-governmental groups, such as the 
Heritage Foundation, argued that the merger of INS and Customs has weakened, not 
strengthened, the capacity of the U.S. government to secure its borders, reform interior 
enforcement, and achieve the national security goals outlined by President Bush. For 
example, in 2004, the GAO reported “that the lack of uniform policies and procedures for 
some ICE operations has caused confusion and hindered the creation of a new integrated 
culture.”16 Not all of these problems, of course, begin with the post-9/11 merger. GAO 
had also argued that the problems facing the immigration enforcement mission began 
well before the formation of the Department of Homeland Security. Immigration 
enforcement suffered under the now defunct Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
which was housed within the Department of Justice, and continues to struggle under its 
new organization as ICE. Still, the transition to the new organizational structure has 
created its own set of problems. GAO asserted, “the integration of INS and Customs 
investigators into a single investigative program has involved the blending of two vastly 
different workforces, each with its own culture, policies, procedures, and mission 
priorities.”17 GAO further found that “important steps remained to be completed at many 
offices to fully integrate investigators.”18 
The failure to adequately and effectively manage the transformation of these 
agencies, according to a variety of sources, bears considerable responsibility for ICE’s 
persistent weaknesses, especially in immigration enforcement. GAO claimed, for 
instance, that poor immigration enforcement was linked to problems due to “significant 
management challenges.”19 Specifically addressing the immigration enforcement mission 
                                                 
16 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in 
Transforming Immigration Programs, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 2004), 4. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0581.pdf (accessed 6 March 2006). 
17 Ibid., 11. 
18 Ibid., 4. 
19 Richard M. Stana, Department of Homeland Security: Addressing Management Challenges that 
Face Immigration Enforcement Agencies, Testimony to House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 
Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 5 May 2005 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Accounting Office, 2005), 12. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05664t.pdf (accessed 6 
March 2006). 
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in ICE and CBP, GAO Director Richard Stana argued that management challenges 
“included a lack of clearly defined priorities and goals; difficulty determining whom to 
coordinate with, when to coordinate, and how to communicate; and inadequately defined 
roles resulting in overlapping responsibilities, inconsistent program implementation, and 
ineffective use of resources.”20 
2. Identifying the Sources of Problems 
Organizational transformation is, of course, a difficult process in itself. Numerous 
studies have focused on the challenges that existed in both the government and the 
private sectors. In 2002 GAO identified nine key practices that were needed for new 
organizations to be successful.21 These practices again resurface in the 2004 GAO report 
titled Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration 
Programs.22 Of these nine key practices, GAO suggested that two of them would be 
particularly beneficial for ICE: establishing a communication strategy and involving 
employees to obtain their ideas. GAO stated that “while we did not assess in this review 
the degree to which these practices are being used, we did identify certain parts of key 
practices that have not been fully integrated into immigration strategies, such as 
establishing a feedback mechanism to identify and address employee concerns.”23 
This thesis examined a wide range of problems both identified separately during 
this research and within the general discussions about DHS’ performance, through the 
lens of lessons learned from the literature on organizational change management. Among 
the various theoretical and empirical insights of previous studies of organizational 
change, this thesis embraced the central significance of the quality and effectiveness of  
 
 
                                                 
20 Stana, Department of Homeland Security: Addressing Management Challenges that Face 
Immigration Enforcement Agencies, 1. 
21 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformations: 
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 2. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-293SP (accessed 7 
March 2006). 
22 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in 
Transforming Immigration Programs, 39.  
23 Ibid., 6. 
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leadership in achieving successful merger. Leadership is essentially critical, as this thesis 
shows, in achieving the two GAO suggested key practices that would be most beneficial 
to ICE.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
The results of this research are of importance, not only to immigration 
enforcement, but also to DHS and the entire organizational strategy that supports the 
nation’s homeland security mission. GAO found, for instance, that “a number of similar 
management challenges that had been experienced by INS have continued in the new 
organizations now responsible for immigration enforcement functions.”24 Director Stana 
stated that among those “management challenges” were clear mission, strategic planning, 
good organizational alignment, performance measures and leadership. 
In order to successfully meet the challenges identified by GAO, ICE leadership 
must execute a strategy of change management that offers critical lessons throughout the 
Department and across the government. In particular, leadership is critical to facilitating 
the emergence of a new culture that members from a variety of very different agencies 
can and will embrace. In ICE’s case, leadership must integrate immigration enforcement 
into a culture that is deeply influenced by the legacy Customs’ orientation. Immigration 
enforcement is difficult and complex. Immigration law enforcement is among the most 
difficult kinds of police work and has been compared in complexity as being second only 
to Internal Revenue Code. It is constantly challenged and changed by court precedent and 
legislative action. Additionally, through its immigration enforcement authority, ICE is 
unique in the federal law enforcement community in that it is the only federal agency that 
arrests and detains most of their own subjects. 
In building a new culture, in achieving organizational change of this magnitude, 
participants’ perceptions are critical. When change management is successful, a new 
corporate identity and culture is developed that is unique to the transformed organization. 
If employees do not believe that they have ownership for the transformation, this will be 
                                                 
24 Stana, Department of Homeland Security: Addressing Management Challenges that Face 
Immigration Enforcement Agencies. 
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difficult to build. Without a break from past identities and cultures, a new agency will not 
be able to refocus and drive itself in a different direction. 
Collateral to the issue of identity and culture are issues of morale and employee 
retention. In a 2002 report, GAO estimated that INS would lose 21% of its employees to 
retirement.25 Additionally, between fiscal years 2001 – 2002, INS suffered a 556 percent 
increase in the loss of agents to other agencies.26  
Legacy INS’ human capital issues were long-standing. According to another 2002 
report by GAO, “INS reported that it did not meet its hiring goal for one reason – a 
significant increase in the loss of agents to other federal agencies.”27 In large part, this 
resulted in an inability to reach their program goals.28 Speaking specifically about interior 
immigration enforcement, Director Stana testified, “our work has shown that INS faced 
numerous daunting enforcement issues, as will BICE as it assumes responsibility for the 
strategy.” 29 Stana noted that GAO had previously reported in 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999 
that INS reported not having sufficient staff to reach its program goals. Retention of 
agents must be a critical step for ICE to address. However, in order to meet the 
challenges of succession planning for a future immigration enforcement mission, it is also 
imperative that ICE place high priority on quality training for new agents.  
D. STUDY DESIGN 
An extensive literature review of government and academic works identified key 
change management principles that were required for successful major organizational 
restructurings and mergers. Using focus groups and interviews involving current and 
former ICE employees, data was collected to address each of these key principles. In each 
                                                 
25 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in 
Transforming Immigration Programs, 47. 
26 Ibid. 
27 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal 
Leadership (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 2002), 47. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03260.pdf (accessed 4 March 2006).   
28 Ibid., 46. 
29 Richard M. Stana, Homeland Security, Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the 
Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy, Testimony to House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 
Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 10 April 2003 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Accounting Office, 2003) 5. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03660t.pdf  (accessed 9 
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focus group, participants were asked similar questions to obtain various perspectives on 
the merger process and its leadership dimensions. Targeted interviews were also 
conducted with subject matters experts (SMEs) to corroborate, clarify and or expand 
upon some of the information obtained in forums. Legacy INS and legacy Customs 
agents served as SMEs and were located at the Federal Law Enforcement Officers 
Academy, as well as ICE Headquarters and ICE field locations. A detailed description of 
these data collection procedures is included in Chapter III. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is considerable literature on the subject of an organizational change 
process, more appropriately titled change management. Change management is a 
systematic approach and application of knowledge, tools and resources that when 
properly employed will facilitate a successful merger or major organizational 
transformation. There are critical steps to this process that need to address the needs of 
not only the organization, but also the individual employees of the organizations involved 
in the merger process.  
This chapter reviews government and academic literature on what constitutes 
change management from a theoretical perspective, such as provided for by Ian 
Kirkpatrick and Stephen Ackroyd; as well as from a practical application perspective, 
such as provided for by Tay Keong Tan, Loizos Heracleous and Steven Kelman. The 
literature review studied successes in change management as demonstrated in pieces by 
Tan, Heracleous, Jenny Stewart and Paul Kringas; and examples of failures cited by 
Daryl Conner and Peter Myer.  
B. GOVERNMENT SOURCES 
There are author/researchers that have chronicled, analyzed and influenced 
successful transformations and mergers in the public sector. However, there are none that 
have done so on as large a scale as the Department of Homeland Security. The literature 
provided good background and theory, offering practical advice for use in public sector. 
However, in words of caution, the Comptroller General of the United States David 
Walker advised: 
A successful merger and acquisition in the private sector can be very 
difficult. In fact, successful merger and transformation efforts can be much 
more difficult to achieve in the public sector than in the private sector. 






centers, less management flexibility, and greater transparency than in the 
private sector. Moreover, creating a successful DHS may be especially 
difficult because of the size, complexity, and importance of the effort.30 
GAO has produced several reports pertaining to organizational transformations; 
however, the seminal guidance on the subject was presented to the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security for the House of Representatives on July 22, 2002. Walker stated, 
“assembling a new organization out of separate pieces and reorienting all of its processes 
and assets to deliver the desired results while managing related risks will take an 
organized systematic approach to change.”31  
On September 24, 2002, the Comptroller and GAO convened a forum to “identify 
and discuss useful practices and lessons learned from major private and public sector 
organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations that federal agencies could 
implement to successfully transform their cultures and a Department of Homeland 
Security could use to merge its various originating components into a unified 
department.”32 The forum’s participants were well-respected representatives of 
government, industry and academia who had experience managing large-scale 
organizational mergers and transformations. This group of senior public and private 
sector leadership represented the Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Partnership for Public 
Service, Private Sector Council, National Academy of Public Administration, Business 
Executives for National Security, The Conference Board, Lockheed Martin Corporation, 
Northrup Grumman, Cisco Systems, Hewlett-Packard Company, J.P. Morgan Chase, 
University of Virginia – Darden Graduate School of Business and others. While the 
participants did not achieve consensus on all issues of change management the outcome 
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Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, 2. 
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Testimony to Select House Committee on Homeland Security, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 17 July 2002 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 2002), 10. 
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32 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformations: 
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, 4.  
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was an “agreement on a number of key practices that have consistently been found at the 
center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations.”33 
In a 2003 Report to Congressional Subcommittees the following nine agreed upon 
practices, identified as “Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and 
Organizational Transformations” were presented:34 
¾ Ensure top leadership drives the transformation 
¾ Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the 
transformation 
¾ Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the 
transformation 
¾ Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show 
progress from day one 
¾ Dedicate a management team to manage the transformation process 
¾ Use the performance management system to define responsibility and 
ensure accountability for change 
¾ Establish a communication strategy to share expectations and report 
related progress 
¾ Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the 
transformation 
¾ Build a world-class organization 
GAO recognized that people were at the center of change management and that to 
be successful in mergers or organizational transformations, strategies had to be used to 
help people adjust to mergers or major organizational changes. If steps were not taken to 
maximize employees’ potential, organizations risked reduced productivity and 
effectiveness. A successfully planned change management process ensured that there was 
a collaborative effort between leadership and employees. GAO recognized that:  
A successful merger and transformation must involve employees and their 
representatives from the beginning to gain their ownership of the changes 
that are occurring in the organization. Employee involvement strengthens 
the transformation process by including frontline perspectives and 
                                                 
33 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformations: 
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, 4. 
34 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations (Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, 2003), 
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experiences. Further, employee involvement helps to create new networks 
and break down existing organizational silos, increase employees’ 
understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and objectives, and 
gain ownership of new policies and procedures. Implementation steps that 
accompany this key practice include using employee teams, involving 
employees in planning and sharing performance information, 
incorporating employee feedback into new policies and procedures, and 
delegating authority to appropriate organizational levels.35 
In 2005, GAO recognized the importance of management integration efforts 
during a merger or transformation, by again referencing the importance of using a 
dedicated implementation team, the need for leadership to drive the process and of 
building momentum to demonstrate progress.36 The emphasis on interim milestones to 
gather momentum for the change process was one of two key elements later found to be 
critical in an approach espoused by Kelman. 
In May 2005, GAO found that the same management challenges that haunted INS 
in 1997 were present in ICE. This report focused on ICE’s management framework and 
the factors of “clarity of mission, strategic planning, organizational alignment, 
performance measures, and leadership focus and accountability.”37 
One of the most significant challenges INS faced was a lack of clearly defined 
priorities and goals. Although GAO had reported before on the importance of this 
challenge, ICE had been unable to develop and define its priorities and goals. ICE had 
clearly stated their mission on official websites, printed literature and in official speeches 
and press releases as, “our mission is to protect America and uphold public safety.” At 
times it had been somewhat expanded by adding a connection to investigating 
immigration and customs violations, but little more detail had been provided. ICE’s  
 
 
                                                 
35 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in 
Transforming Immigration Programs, 40. 
36 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and 
Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Accounting Office, 2005), 4-5. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05139.pdf (accessed 11 March 2006). 
37 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Department of Homeland Security: Addressing Management 
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priorities have not been simply stated; however, viewing their current enforcement 
programs may provide insight on those areas ICE management believes to be 
important.38  
¾ ICE is the second largest federal law enforcement contributor to the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force.  
¾ ICE dismantles gang organizations by targeting their members, seizing 
their financial assets and disrupting their criminal operations through 
Operation Community Shield.  
¾ ICE investigates employers and targets illegal workers who have gained 
access to critical infrastructure worksites (like nuclear and chemical 
plants, military installations, seaports and airports) through the Worksite 
Enforcement Initiative.  
¾ ICE helps to identify fraudulent immigration benefit applications and 
fraudulent illegal document manufacture and target violators through the 
Identity and Benefit Fraud Program.  
¾ ICE investigates the illegal export of U.S. munitions and sensitive 
technology through the Project Shield America Initiative.  
¾ ICE helps combat criminal organizations that smuggle and traffic in 
humans across the borders through the Human Smuggling and Trafficking 
Initiative.  
¾ ICE aggressively seeks to destroy the financial infrastructure that criminal 
organizations use to earn, move and store illicit funds through the 
Cornerstone Initiative.  
¾ ICE plays a leading role in targeting criminal organizations responsible for 
producing, smuggling and distributing counterfeit products through the 
National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center.  
¾ ICE supports the law enforcement community through three units 
dedicated to sharing information and providing investigative support: the 
Law Enforcement Support Center, Forensic Document Laboratory, and the 
Cyber Crimes Center.  
GAO found “in successful transformation efforts, developing, communicating, 




                                                 
38 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “About ICE,” 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (accessed 3 January 2007). 
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intends to accomplish, as well as helps employees figure out how their positions fit in 
with the new organization and what they need to do differently to help the new 
organization achieve success.”39  
C. ACADEMIC SOURCES 
There are different types of collaborations, however a permanent collaboration, 
which is needed in a successful merger “generally involves common goals.”40 According 
to Professor Myrna P. Mandell, there are five factors that affect relationships: 
commitment of members, perceptions and values of members, imposition of rules and 
regulations, relative power of members and impact of political/cultural context.41 Some 
of these factors are related to the key practices identified by GAO.  
The perception and values of members can color the attitude they bring into a 
collaborative effort. The relative power of members may result in influence and control 
over other members. These factors relate to the key practice of involving employees in 
the change process. If employees perceive that their ideas are unimportant or that their 
ideas will not be heard, it can hinder their ownership in the transformation process.  
Professor Mandell believed that the impact of political and cultural context is a 
factor affecting relationships in collaborative relationships. However, it is more than that 
in the context of a merger and it has a two-fold impact on organizational change. In the 
political sense, government agencies have a hierarchical structure and relationship 
between leadership and staff and “they are not willing to give up their status or position 
vis-à-vis others in the effort.”42 This attitude, experienced in a merger, can limit the 
success of the collaborative effort.  
The cultural context factor is of particular interest in the merger of Customs and 
INS. “The cultural context refers to the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the members 
                                                 
39 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Department of Homeland Security: Addressing Management 
Challenges That Face Immigration Enforcement Agencies, 8. 
40 Myrna P. Mandell, “Types of Collaborations and Why the Differences Really Matter,” Public 
Manager 31, no. 4 (Winter 2002/2003): 36. (accessed through ProQuest, 4 March 2006). 
41 Mandell, “Types of Collaborations,” 37-38. 
42 Ibid., 38. 
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based on their own individual backgrounds and organizational entities they represent.”43 
The greater the differences between two merging cultures, the more problematic the 
change process and greater likelihood of an unsuccessful merger. 
When great cultural differences exist between two merging organizational 
structures, a “disconnect between members’ hopes and realities of collaboration”44 can 
occur. To mitigate this disconnect key stakeholders from both organizations must be 
involved in a collaborative effort to effect change on an incremental basis. By sharing 
information and expertise, trust is developed and eventually more complex issues can be 
discussed.  
In the past, more study had been conducted on the process of change in the private 
sector versus the public sector; however, “in recent years there has been growing interest 
in analyzing processes of change in professional service organizations drawing on the 
concepts of archetype theory.”45 Archetype theory was defined by Royston Greenwood 
and C.R. Hinings in two general statements:46 
¾ Organizational structures and management systems are best understood by 
analysis of overall patterns rather than by analysis of narrowly drawn sets 
of organizational properties 
¾ Patterns are a function of the ideas, beliefs, and values - the components of 
an interpretive scheme 
According to Greenwood and Hinings, an understanding of archetype theory is 
important for understanding organizational change in two different archetypes: 
heteronomous professional bureaucracy archetype and the corporate bureaucracy 
archetype. 
The heteronomous professional bureaucracy archetype concerns itself with the 
delivery of essential services, such as social programs and police and fire protection, as 
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45 Ian Kirkpatrick and Stephen Ackroyd, “Archetype Theory and the Changing Professional 
Organization: A Critique and Alternative,” Organization 10, no. 4 (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
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an outcome of historical need. In this structure, the organization delivers each of these 
services along separate specialized work units based upon the competencies required by a 
particular discipline. The activities required to provide each service are viewed uniquely 
separate from one another.  
The corporate bureaucracy archetype views the organization delivering these 
same seemingly disparate services as an integrator. The purpose of the organization is not 
administrative as in the professional bureaucracy archetype; rather it is an instrument of 
community governance with values and accountability on a macro level.  
The heteronomous professional bureaucracy archetype has accountability within 
professional disciplines, with compensation, appraisals and resource allocation arranged 
to support incremental organizational change. The corporate professional bureaucracy 
archetype is structured to support broader organizational goals and a framework that 
supports integration of activities toward meeting these goals; it is therefore more capable 
of supporting major organizational change. Change does occur in both of these 
archetypes in the same manner, a process of interpretive de-coupling and re-coupling of 
roles in the organization, just at differing levels.  
Although the theory was developed after rigorous study of private firms, such as 
those pertaining to law and accountancy, a number of scholars have espoused the validity 
of applying it toward understanding change in public sector organizations. However, 
Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd challenged the use of archetype theory for the analysis of 
change in public sector professional service organizations.  
Structure can be described as the framework that allows an organization to 
function by establishing relationships and assigning authority and responsibility. This 
framework serves to coordinate and control power. Two predominant theories for 
structure are classical and classical contingency. The classical theorists believe that there 
is one best organizational structure, while classical contingency theorists believe that 
there is no one best way to structure. Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd stated that the archetype 
theory provided a better place for change actors than the classical contingency theory, but 
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they believed that the differences between private and public sector organizations were 
too different to allow for the archetype theory’s use in public sector organizations.  
They believed that among the weaknesses inherent in the archetype theory were 
that the professions involved in a private law or accountancy firm could not be 
generalized to fit public sector organizations. They believed this to be problematic 
because “not only might we exaggerate the control some professions (such as those in the 
public sector) have over service organizations, there is a risk of overstating the extent to 
which the professions initiate and support management change.”47 
Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd promoted an alternative approach to view organizational 
change, blending Margaret Archer’s development of morphogenic theory with the 
sociology of professions and naming their concept the morphogenic theory of 
organization.48  
Archer proposed that organizations form and reform through agents. The actions 
of these agents, or key figures, influenced to a greater degree the activities of many. 
Archer believed “that agency produces structures and these, in turn, profile the context 
and conditions for further action.”49 This relationship provided the agency with a more 
prominent role in organizational change, be it positive or negative. Kirkpatrick and 
Ackroyd said, “applying Archer’s analysis to organizations suggests that structures do not 
necessarily change in a straightforward way as the balance of power shifts between 
groups – as implied in resource dependency theory for example.”50 
Archer differentiated between two types of agents that Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd 
thought explained the enhanced ability of a profession within an agency to influence and 
shape organizational change; these are primary agents and corporate agents. Primary 
agents reproduce existing conditions, while corporate agents can influence conditions and 
shape the agency.  
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Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd said, “following Archer, professions may be viewed as 
corporate agents or as groups that have enhanced capacity to influence or shape practice 
in organizations.”51 They used the sociology of professions to help understand “the 
relationship between general processes of professionalization and the particular modes of 
service organization that emerge in different circumstances.”52 Using this concept, they 
discovered much about the relative capacities of professional groups to act within 
organizations. This research can be used to help analyze legacy immigration enforcement 
agents and legacy customs enforcement agents as separate and distinct professional 
groups within ICE and therefore identify the group that can best influence the 
organization in a positive way. 
D. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 
Tay Keong Tan and Loizos Heracleous assisted the Asian national police force 
(NPF) in a successful large-scale organizational change by helping transform NPF “into a 
learning organization (LO) infusing the philosophies of Peter Senge’s (1990) five 
disciplines.”53 
According to Senge, a learning organization is one that brings people together to 
learn, change and grow. He developed five core disciplines that he believed were needed 
to become a learning organization:54 
¾ Systems thinking based on system dynamics  
¾ Personal mastery in clarifying and deepening personal vision  
¾ Mental models of looking inward at our perceptions  
¾ Shared visions of commitment and enrollment with others  
¾ Team learning to suspend assumptions and learn together 
Tan and Heracleous used an “action research” methodology to introduce these 
disciplines to NPF. Action research is a fluid and dynamic process developed by the 
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founder of modern social psychology, Kurt Lewin. More than just studying and 
chronicling the changes at NPF, the process of action research introduced the 
“researchers’ direct involvement in practical settings” to achieve the organizational 
change sought by NPF.  
Through in-depth interviews with NPF’s staff during the transformational process, 
Tan and Heracleous provided NPF’s leadership with continual feedback that they would 
use to fine-tune the process towards developing the core disciplines as espoused by 
Senge. For the application of any corrective actions suggested in this thesis, it is 
noteworthy to reflect upon Tan and Heracleous’ realization that “even though 
transformational change was ultimately desired, it could not be carried out swiftly 
because any lapse in the organization’s functionality potentially could have disastrous 
consequences for public safety.”55 
Tan and Heracleous’ approach “illustrates that a bottom-up participative process 
(e.g., in developing a vision for the future) is important to inculcating a sense of 
ownership of change initiatives by organizational members and in providing a credible 
direction toward which to advance through highlighting a gap between a vision and the 
current reality and the use of frequent and multifaceted communication to create 
readiness for organizational change.”56  
“This case study illustrates how the disciplines of the LO can be used in public 
sector organizations as tools for large-scale organizational change, from conservative and 
often inefficient bureaucracies to forward-looking and responsive organizations.”57 Also 
found crucial to this study was the need for transformational/incremental change to be 
properly timed so that the ability to deliver services is not hindered.58  
A collaborative approach between all levels of employees and management at the 
United States Department of Education was used to assist the department toward 
becoming a more focused and efficient agency. Madeline M. Kunin was Deputy 
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Secretary of Education, when she followed the advice produced by the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service to help organizations through major reorganizations:59 
¾ Use personal methods of communication in dealing with employees 
whenever possible  
¾ Give employees clear and consistent written and verbal information on 
employee rights and how to apply for jobs  
¾ Keep in mind that major influences on relocation decisions include 
whether the employee wants to stay with the agency and whether the 
employee can relocate  
¾ In the event that an agency’s restructuring will involve advertising 
positions within the agency, provide seminars on the job application 
process, and give all employees memos and fact sheets on this process 
The Department of Education developed a performance measurement system to 
track progress that held each individual, employee as well as manager, accountable to a 
standard. Ninety-three percent of the department’s regulations were eliminated or 
reinvented to streamline their business and reduce the burden on employees. Empowering 
front-line employees and including them in the organization change process assisted in 
Education becoming more efficient. According to Kunin, “from a base of six layers of 
supervision in 1993, we have slimmed down to 3.5 organizational layers, and we are fast 
approaching our target of 3 layers by 1997.”60  
Daryl Conner and Peter Meyer provide empirical evidence pointing to four 
reasons that organizations often fail to realize their full potential in managing major 
change:  
¾ Lack of clear decisions and goals  
¾ Executive management not taking an active leadership role  
¾ Underestimating that people are the biggest variable  
¾ Not correctly estimating the capacity for change 
Before implementing any major change process, it is imperative that goals are 
clearly defined and established. “Although defining the criteria for success can be a 
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complicated and difficult task, the downside is worse.”61 According to Dr. Wayne 
Hockmeyer of MedImmune, Inc., “projects that didn’t achieve the expected outcome 
lacked focus, as well as personal intervention by two or three senior people within the 
organization.”62  
Success was realized at The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. when a 
person or team acted as an architect, looking for integration points. Hartford’s leadership 
knew that their senior-level executives had to be engaged throughout the change process. 
Hartford’s John Madigan said, “although some executives may think this level of effort 
should not be necessary, our executive interviews clearly indicate that change must be 
sold, resold, emphasized, and monitored throughout the change management process.”63  
The largest variable in the change process is the human side. The ability to 
understand and embrace change for employees is often difficult. Bon Secours Health 
System selected a new clinical information system that technically functioned, but by 
underestimating the difficulties employees would have in learning to work with the new 
system, the changeover took twice as long to achieve. Organizations such as 
MedImmune, which were successful with change management, were so because they 
understood their employees and “because people felt like a community with common 
goals and objectives.”64  
Finally, failure at change can occur because core skills needed to execute the 
change do not exist. As the change process unfolds, the business of the organization must 
continue and core skills and resources are needed to address both activities. As noted by 
Hartford’s Madigan during a major change initiative, “we are changing the tires while the 
car is in motion.”65 For success an organization needs the capacity to carry on business 
during the change process. Madigan said, “the human capacity to absorb change is 
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reduced when those changes are not seen as integrated, not part of one new approach to 
things. When people cannot absorb change, change does not occur.”66  
According to Jenny Stewart and Paul Kringas, “change is a ubiquitous theme in 
management literature, but empirical studies that seek to draw lessons from the 
experience of managing change are rare.”67 Stewart and Kringas analyzed patterns of 
change management in six Australian federal agencies that supported “a number of broad 
themes already apparent in the literature and suggest that change processes that have the 
support of the workforce require good leadership, an appropriate model of change, some 
room for negotiation and compromise and well-planned communication.”68 
Stewart and Kringas developed their research, data collection and evaluation 
efforts to rank the six agencies according to two outcome measures: objective change and 
perceived change. The following factors were present in the agencies that realized 
successful outcomes in both measures:69 
¾ An appropriate change model  
¾ Effective leadership  
¾ Sufficient resources  
¾ Attention to communication 
One of the more contemporary theories on how to execute organizational change 
from a practical perspective is provided by Steven Kelman. From 1993 through 1997, 
Kelman was the administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in the 
Office of Management and Budget. In this capacity, he was responsible for the successful 
transformation of the federal procurement process. 
Large organizations in particular, are in a constant state of change to some extent; 
however, the change that is most difficult is “where it requires modification of embedded 
                                                 
66 Conner and Myer, Managing Change, 10. 
67 Jenny Stewart and Paul Kringas, “Change Management-Strategy and Values in Six Agencies from 
the Australian Police Service,” Public Administration Review 63, no.6 (Nov/Dec 2003) (Washington: 
American Society for Public Administration, 2003): 675. (accessed through ProQuest, 4 March 2006). 
68 Stewart and Kringas, Change Management Strategy, 675. 
69 Ibid., 686. 
 27
individual behavior patterns or ways the organization has been structured.”70 Kelman 
believed that most organizational change processes were incomplete because they were 
based upon overly simplistic tactics. He also noted, “the suggestion that people in general 
resist change contradicts much experience of our everyday lives”71 and that there are 
often those who are discontented as well as satisfied with the status quo.72 The approach 
Kelman utilized at OFPP was two tactics he coined as “activating the discontented” and 
“change feeding on itself.”73 
In activating the disconnected, Kelman argued that there are disfranchised 
members in most organizations, who form a core group favorable to change. This group 
not only makes up those who do not like the status quo, but also those who seek change 
by their very nature. When federal procurement reform was announced, Kelman found 
that there existed a group of “procurement reformers before reform began” and they were 
soon “joined by a second group, people who had not previously been advocates of change 
but became favorably disposed to giving reform a try soon after it got started.”74  
The first group, which Kelman called the “change vanguard”, consisted of those 
frontline employees who vocalized their discontent before reform was announced. The 
second group, called “early recruits” joined the change vanguard, which initiated the 
transformational process. 
The second part of Kelman’s formula - change feeding on itself, delivers the point 
that once change starts the movement feeds upon itself and gathers momentum. As 
positive feedback occurs “a movement in one direction sets in motion forces producing 
further movement in the same direction.”75 While it appears that activating the 
discontented is of primary importance and that once change starts it will automatically 
lead to success, there are pitfalls that can derail the transformation process. 
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Change feeding on itself does not function in a vacuum and government 
bureaucracies by their very nature do not facilitate innovation. For change to gather 
momentum and perpetuate, it requires successes; however, success does not come 
without risk. As Kelman quotes from Robert Behn’s The Dilemmas of Innovation in 
American Government, “the dirty little secret is that innovation requires failure. The 
corollary is that unless an organization tolerates… failure, it is unlikely to get much 
innovation.”76 Tolerance needs to be exhibited for good faith attempts that fail in order to 
engage and consolidate forces to continue to fuel the transformation process.  
E. TRAINING’S RELATIONSHIP IN THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS 
The last topic covered in the literature review is training used as a process or step 
in organizational change. It is by no means last because it lacks importance; it is last in 
this paper because of its significance and relationship to some of ICE’s issues. 
Unfortunately, when it was stated early on that there was “considerable literature on the 
subject” of change management, this did not include literature on change management 
juxtaposed with training as a significant change agent.  
Training does have a part in helping agencies implement change, but “the 
interrelationship between training and change management is very underexplored.”77 
According to Colin Talbot there were three roles for training in organizational change. 
First, it’s used for developing adaptive skills; second, it’s used for developing adoptive 
skills; and third, it is used as a change agent. Adaptive skills were those new skills that 
were needed “to meet new or changed demands.”78 These were the skills that a person 
needs to technically perform their job. Below is a simple model that Talbot used to show 
knowledge acquisition of adaptive skills: 
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Figure 1.   Individual Skill and Acquisition Model (From: Colin Talbot).79 
 
“Adoptive change training focuses more on the acceptance of change, getting staff 
to adopt new values, attitudes or behaviour in carrying out their duties.”80 This approach 
is used to change or develop an organizational culture. Often both adaptive and adoptive 
training must be executed in near proximity to each other for training to be a successful 
change management intervention. However, for training to become more than a change 
management intervention, an added dimension is required: innovation feedback.  
At the conclusion of many training sessions, participants may be typically asked 
to evaluate the training. This often entails questions of a logistical or creature comfort 
nature - was it too hot, was your chair comfortable; and of a technical nature – did the 
training meet your needs, was the instructor informed. These types of questions are for 
the trainers to refine and improve the course; however, a third opportunity exists in this 
process and “this is innovative feedback about the organization itself, its structures, 
systems, policies and procedures.”81 
These kinds of issues are very often brought up and typically dismissed as 
noise.82 There are two reasons why this innovative feedback is important, especially 
during change management processes. First, from a practical perspective, it is often those 
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doing the work that have the best suggestions. This is why involving employees to obtain 
their ideas is a key practice for organizational transformations.83 “The second failure is 
psychological and cultural – management are giving a clear message to staff that 
innovation and ideas from below are unwelcome. In a situation of change, which 
management are trying to get staff to accept and own, such a message is clearly counter-
productive.”84 
On-the-Job training (OJT) has typically been used for individual training 
objectives and often with newer employees. However, when used with a combination of 
other training platforms such as classroom and computer-based training it can be used to 
deliver cascade training. “Cascade training has been defined as the process of providing 
the competence required to ensure institutionalization of organizational change” as part 
of the change management process.85 Change within organizations is often difficult. In 
one study of 294 medium-sized companies only one in five reported their change efforts 
as successful.86 Starting with the “Training With Industry (TWI) effort during World War 
II” to quickly and effectively gear up for war production and used by Xerox and Ford in 
the 1980s, cascade training has proved it can be successful.87  
Although there are four different types of cascade training - hierarchical, 
employee role, process and project, they can be used in varying combinations. The 
hierarchical is the most common and is driven from the top down. Leadership learns first, 
then knowledge is passed down to managers, who in turn pass it down to supervisors and 
so on. This approach “ensures that everyone organization-wide understands the change 
and addresses three issues related to employee competence: (a) which tasks to keep 
doing, (b) which tasks to stop doing, and (c) which new tasks to begin doing.”88  
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Employee role cascade training is peer-based. In government parlance it is often 
called train-the-trainer training. Employees with knowledge impart their knowledge to 
peers. “Such an arrangement makes use of the particular insights that only those in a 
particular role might have in adjusting to the new task.”89 
Process cascade training is cross-functional. This kind of training may be required 
when one position’s skills, duties or outputs are adjusted, which has an affect on 
surrounding positions. The surrounding positions need to be informed so that “others 
become aware of it and acquire the areas of competence necessary to respond 
accordingly.”90 
Project cascade training “follows the interconnections of groups, both internal and 
external to the organization, who are working in achieving the same goal.”91 This training 
is useful when there are stakeholders who must understand the change even though they 
may not be directly affected. 
“Given the foundational role of individual competence on successful 
organizational change,” training should be key in the process.92 Jacobs and Russ-Eft 
suggest that when training is part of the process, it should achieve the following goals: 
¾ Address the respective competence needs of the employees affected by the 
change, including the use of awareness, managerial, and technical training 
¾ Use an array of training approaches that are best suited to meet those 
needs, including both training conducted on the job and off the job 
¾ Be coordinated so that the training outcomes of one group are reconciled 
with the training outcomes of other groups 
Training is not a one-stop procedure, especially when used in the context of a 
change management process. Organizations must ensure that the skills needed were 
acquired during the training. Completion of a training program is not evidence of know-
how. “Ensuring that know-how transfer takes place and that the training is then put into 
practice in a working situation is often neglected: more probable is the assumption that 
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the new knowledge can be used somehow and sometime.”93 When know-how is not 
transferred, its cause may be employee resistance to change, which “can be structured 
into three categories: personnel, organization and technical.”94  
Personnel resistance can relate to the employee, peers and supervision having 
doubts about the introduction of know-how. Organizational issue may arise when new 
techniques and know-how impact and don’t mesh with parts of the organization operating 
under old processes. Technical problems can result from mixing new knowledge and old 
technologies, “for example the know-how to use new software in an organization in 
which the current computers do not have enough capacity – technical resistance.” 95 
From a strategic point, leadership must be able to identify any resistance and take steps to 
minimize its impact. 
F. SUMMARY 
The literature review revealed various theories and approaches for change 
management. A rational model approach may involve more business-like planning, 
problem solving and execution, while a sociological approach may be more holistic and 
devoted to human interactions, internal networks and social order. The rational model 
approach is management centered and follows the steps enumerated by GAO’s nine key 
practices. This approach was used by the Department of Education, the six Australian 
federal agencies and others. The sociological perspective approach concentrates on 
factors identified as important by Mandell, Greenwood, Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd. 
A rational or practical approach is often policy-based. Although this is most often 
used by most public organizations, it does not mean important concepts cannot be drawn 
from a theoretical or sociological-based approach, such as described by Greenwood and 
Hinings. If their heteronomous professional bureaucracy archetype was applied to ICE, it 
could be argued that the two disciplines of immigration enforcement and customs 
enforcement are distinct and specialized disciplines; therefore, the concept of one agency 
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performing both immigration and customs missions may not be the best structure. 
However, Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd believe that archetype theory did not lend itself to 
public entities. Based upon Archer, Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd, how agencies bargain with 
professional groups within the agency is more important in facilitating change than 
attempting change by policy alone. 
Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd’s morphogenic theory of organization supports the 
practical bottom-up participative process used by Tan and Heracleous. Tan and 
Heracleous were successful assisting the NPF using an action research methodology. 
Under certain structural conditions, corporate agents in public sector can facilitate 
change, but not to the extent that corporate agents who have achieved institutional 
autonomy, such as in the law and accountancy fields. Change in public sector is more 
reliant on the way the agency bargained with professional groups than the power 
contained within the group itself. Change mandated by policy objectives often leaves 
public sector corporate agents uninvolved in the process. Because of this it is important to 
emphasize how the change is “consistent with the perceived interest of professions (or at 
least with those of elite groups within them).”96  
Both approaches affected the thesis. The focus group analysis was viewed through 
a sociological lens. As example, for successful permanent collaboration, Mandell points 
to five factors important to relationships. Among these factors was the commitment of 
members to the new organization’s success. ICE used a policy-driven, practical approach 
to the change management and during the focus groups, evidence of commitment was 
sought, but was not found in any consensus. Therefore questions were then asked about 
the merger in an attempt to identify any practices or steps used that would have resulted 
in enabling commitment such as employee input or participation in the process.  
As numerous GAO and other reports have shown, the merger of INS and Customs 
has not produced an efficient agency in ICE. ICE Special Agents do not perceive that 
their legacy agency interests are served in the new organization. The reorganization that 
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occurred under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security has faltered on 
nearly each of the requirements for successful change management reviewed throughout 
this chapter. As mentioned previously, GAO has concluded that this failure has left the 
nation with a poorly executed immigration enforcement mission. According to the 
numerous analyses and reports by DHS OIG, the Heritage Foundation, and others, ICE’s 
continuing organizational confusion remains the primary cause of much of the agency’s 
problems. ICE has inherited the legacy of organizational dysfunctionalism, which was 
prevalent in INS. The failure of the merger and reasons why, will be demonstrated in 
Chapters IV and V. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the research for this thesis was to examine the ways in which the 
merger and organizational transformation of ICE had achieved its own aims. The 
literature provided reference on how successful change is achieved. Clearly, as the GAO 
and other reports on ICE’s progress indicated, the organizational reforms had not been 
successful. The agency remains riddled with efficiency and effectiveness problems, and 
the key elements of organizational transformation have simply not been met. This 
research pursues in some detail one of the crucial elements of change management - the 
perception of employees.  
To accomplish these objectives, the methodology had to gain access to the 
detailed experiences, views, and attitudes of ICE employees. Among the many different 
methodologies available to collect data are observation, documentation review, surveys, 
interviews and focus group. There are many reasons to choose one method over another. 
Observation can adapt and accurately monitor a changing milieu. However, access can be 
an issue, it can be time consuming and expensive and observed behaviors might be 
difficult to interpret.  
Documentation review is often non-disruptive to operations and provides good 
historical information. However, it is just that – historical, and in a changing environment 
the data may not be accurate or relevant to the current situation.  
Surveys are relatively inexpensive, easy to administer and analyze and can be 
used for large samplings. By their anonymity they are also impersonal and are not 
conducive for ferreting out beliefs that can be better elicited after developing rapport with 
a person, such as can be accomplished in an interview or focus group. The better of the 
methodologies for extracting deep-rooted feelings and beliefs are in-depth interviews or 
focus groups. 
Interviews can be very valuable and share some of the same attributes of focus 
groups. After a relationship is developed between the interviewer and interviewee, in-
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depth information can be obtained, but the process may be time-consuming especially if 
information is needed from a number of people. Focus groups have the advantage of 
being able to develop a rapport between the facilitator/moderator and the group, but 
scheduling a group may be more problematic than setting up individual interviews. In 
balance and for the purposes of this thesis, focus groups were chosen as the preferred 
medium for obtaining data for several reasons. The focus group process assists a 
researcher in obtaining a group view. It emphasizes group perceptions, in this instance, 
legacy INS and legacy Customs, which were being sought. However, in addition to the 
focus groups, a few targeted interviews were conducted with subject matter experts. The 
purpose of the targeted interviews was primarily to corroborate and expand upon some of 
the information obtained in the group settings.  
B. WHY WAS THE RESEARCH CONDUCTED 
Although previous studies and employee surveys on ICE had documented some 
of the issues of interest in this thesis, most were dated and they did not gather information 
in detail from a broad spectrum of employees. Fresh data was needed for this thesis in 
order to make meaningful recommendations. The mix of participants in these focus 
groups provided unparalleled access to key insights into the difficulties ICE leaders 
faced. 
There were four primary objectives the research needed to achieve. First, was that 
it needed to validate or not validate that ICE was a cohesive and efficient organization. 
Secondly, was to test the thesis’ core hypothesis - that the root cause for the failure to 
produce a cohesive and efficient organization was a failure of the change management 
process to merge INS and Customs. Third, was that the research needed to assess the 
depth and cause for the much discussed friction between legacy INS and Customs’ 
agents. Fourth, was that commonality among agents’ perceptions within a group would 
be found, which would assist in formulating recommendations for corrective actions. 
C. HOW WAS THE RESEARCH CONDUCTED 
Arizona was chosen for the site of the focus groups for practical and significant 
reasons. From a practical standpoint, the researcher was located in Arizona, which 
simplified logistics. However, more importantly there were three significant reasons that 
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also prevailed in selecting the location. First, Arizona is a gateway state for alien and 
cargo entry into the United States. It is the linchpin along the southern border that 
presents an enormous vulnerability to the United States for problems of an immigration 
enforcement and customs enforcement nature. Secondly, it is much publicized in the 
media that ICE and the state and local authorities have a poor relationship. Third, ICE’s 
internal problems in Arizona are well known throughout the Department and this has 
resulted in ICE being unable to recruit or retain senior management. No other ICE office 
in the country has experienced the succession of leadership as Arizona.  
With the cooperation of the ICE Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of Arizona, ICE 
management in Washington, D.C. agreed to allow ICE agents to participate in the focus 
groups on a voluntary and confidential basis. Two managers provided table of 
organizations (TO) for their respective offices. Prospective participants were selected 
randomly from the TO. Several agents who learned of the focus groups also called and 
asked to participate. If they matched the characteristics of the focus group participants, 
these volunteers also joined the interview and focus group activities. 
From a pool of approximately 245 ICE agents in Arizona, a total of 38 agents 
participated. The plan was to solicit six to eight volunteers for each of five groups, with a 
representative sampling of males and females in each group and to include agents from 
the ICE offices in Phoenix, Tucson and Yuma. 
The response from legacy INS supervision did not reach the ideal number of 
participants. Approximately 60% of the ICE agents in Phoenix were legacy INS agents. 
However, at the supervisory level, legacy INS agents held only 36% of the supervisory 
positions and statewide, legacy INS accounted for only 12% of the management 
positions. This phenomenon proved slightly problematic in soliciting from legacy INS 
supervision – there simply were not enough legacy INS managers in Arizona for a full six 
to eight person group. However, in general the responses and requests to participate from 
the legacy employees, especially non-supervisors, were overwhelming and those groups 
were artificially sealed at twelve participants each.  
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Average phone contact time to explain the study and solicit volunteers was 8 
minutes per call with several calls lasting 15 to 20 minutes each. A few calls reached 
agents that would be out of the office on training or annual leave during the time the  
focus groups were scheduled to convene. Typically, the agents that could not attend still 
wanted input into the process and have their opinions heard. These phone contacts lasted 
approximately 30 minutes. 
Because evidence pointed to conflict between legacy INS and Customs groups, it 
would have been difficult to blend legacy groups and still create an open and trusting 
atmosphere conducive to frank discussion in a focus group setting. Therefore, segregated 
focus groups along legacy agency affiliation were formed to provide insight into the 
individual group’s shared understanding of various issues. The insight and information 
obtained as a result of the interaction between the participants was vital for understanding 
the root cause of the issues explored by the thesis. The participants were also divided into 
non-supervisor and supervisor groups. The participants of each group were confidential 
and known only to those within a group. 
The focus groups consisted of five homogeneous, distinct groupings. They 
included: 
¾ Group One consisted of legacy Customs non-supervisors 
¾ Group Two consisted of legacy INS non-supervisors 
¾ Group Three consisted of legacy Customs supervisors 
¾ Group Four consisted of legacy INS supervisors 
¾ Group Five consisted of ICE new hires 
The focus groups were conducted in Phoenix, Arizona from July 25, 2006 through 
July 27, 2006.97 Upon arrival at the venue, the participants were greeted and basic 
introductions were made of the moderator and note-taker. The focus group process and 
background information was provided to the participants. The participants completed a 
personal data card that requested the following information on each participant: sex, 
legacy agency, number of years at legacy agency, pay grade and age bracket. A 
comments section also appeared on the bottom of the data card.                                                   
97 The venue for the focus groups was Arizona’s backup state Emergency Operations Center located at 
Arizona State University, Mesa, Arizona. 
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The interaction between the participants helped them to evaluate and reconsider 
their positions, which led to an emphasized group view – a hallmark advantage to the 
focus group methodology. Using a focus group methodology for this study resulted in a 
synergy from the group dynamic that exposed attitudes, feelings and beliefs of ICE’s sub-
cultures, which yielded the empirical evidence sought.  
Important issues raised during the focus groups were later corroborated by 
targeted one-on-one interviews with SMEs. Other interviews were conducted to 
demonstrate that the thesis problem is universal and not just at the location of the focus 
groups. The interviews were of both legacy INS and legacy Customs individuals located 
predominantly in larger field offices, at ICE Headquarters in Washington, D.C. and at the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. 
D. FOCUS GROUP COMPOSITION 
Most everyone that was approached to volunteer for the focus groups agreed to 
participate, except for one agent, who provided no reason, and a few agents in training, 
on annual leave or those with prior operational or court commitments. The composition 
of each focus group had similarities as well as differences. The ratio of male to female 
participants was similar and the pay grades of participants was similar. However, the 
number of years the participants were at their legacy agency and the participants’ ages 
were significantly different. Legacy INS participants tended to be older and had more 
years of service at INS than the legacy Customs participants had at Customs. 
Table 1 identifies the focus groups and compares their basic characteristics: the 
group’s participant with the least number of years at the legacy, the group’s participant 
with the most number of years at legacy agency, the group’s average for the number of 
years at a legacy agency, the pay grades of the participants, the pay grade most 
represented within a group, the participants’ age bracket and the age bracket most 




In the non-supervisory focus group for legacy Customs, the participant with the 
least amount of Customs time before the merger had 6 months experience. In the non-
supervisory focus group for legacy INS, the participant with the least amount of INS time 
before the merger had 5 years experience. 
In the supervisory focus group for legacy Customs, the participant with the least 
amount of Customs time before the merger had 13 years experience. In the supervisory 
focus group for legacy INS, the participant with the least amount of INS time before the 
merger had 25 years experience. 
In the non-supervisory focus group for legacy Customs, the participant with the 
most amount of Customs time before the merger had 7 years experience. In the non-
supervisory focus group for legacy INS, the participant with the most amount of INS time 
before the merger had 21 years experience. 
In the supervisory focus group for legacy Customs, the participant with the most 
amount of Customs time before the merger had 20 years experience. In the supervisory 
focus group for legacy INS, the participant with the most amount of INS time before the 
merger had 31 years experience. 
In the non-supervisory focus group for legacy Customs, the average amount of 
Customs experience before the merger was 2.9 years. In the non-supervisory focus group 
for legacy INS, the average amount of INS experience time before the merger was 15 
years.  
In the supervisory focus group for legacy Customs, the average amount of 
Customs experience before the merger was 16.3 years. In the supervisory focus group for 
legacy INS, the average amount of INS experience time before the merger was 28 years. 
The pay grades represented in the non-supervisory legacy Customs group were 
GS-12 and GS-13.98 The pay grades represented in the non-supervisory legacy INS group 
were GS-11 and GS-13. Most participants in both non-supervisory legacy INS and non- 
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supervisory legacy Customs groups were GS-13. The pay grades of all participants in the 
supervisory legacy Custom group were GS-15. The pay grades for participants in the 
legacy INS group were GS-14 and GS-15. 
Both non-supervisory groups had representation in the age brackets of 27 – 32, 33 
– 38 and over 45 years. The majority of legacy Customs participants were between 33 
and 38 years old. The majority of legacy INS’ participants were over 45 years old. 
Supervisory legacy Customs participants had representation in the age brackets of 
39 – 44 and over 45 with most of the participants between 39 and 45 years old. All 
supervisory legacy INS participants were over 45 years old.  
The new hires did not have legacy time to report. The participants represented pay 
grades 11 and 13, with grade 11 being the most represented. The age brackets of 27 – 32, 
33 – 38 and 39 – 44 were represented by the participants, with the 27 –32 bracket having 
the greatest representation.  
In summary, comparing the combined characteristics of non-supervisory and 
supervisory legacy Customs groups to the combined characteristics of non-supervisory 
and supervisory INS groups the following information is obtained. Prior to the merger, 
legacy INS agents had approximately twice the length of experience with INS than the 
legacy Customs agents had with Customs – 21.5 years at INS to 9.6 years at Customs. 
Legacy Customs participants were on average at a higher pay grade than legacy INS 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter reports and analyzes the focus group discussions within the context 
of the primary theoretical issues identified earlier in the literature review. For example, 
the focus groups identified a number of critical issues of concern, such as the lack of 
communication in the merger process. Looking to the literature, a communication plan in 
the merger process is critical to successful mergers and transformations. Therefore, the 
lack of communication contributed negatively to the change management process and 
negatively affected the desired end result of a successful merger.  
This analysis is divided into Chapters IV and V. Chapter IV deals with the agency 
issues of mission and priorities, resources, type of work and agency efficiency and the 
personal issues of stress and tension, self-image and morale. Chapter V deals with the 
merger process itself. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As shown in the literature review in Chapter II, development of a sound change 
management strategy involves several key activities or dimensions: the degree of 
autonomy in the workforce, private entity versus public agency, the criticality of services 
provided and the need to time incremental change in order to continually deliver services 
are all considerations for business and government leadership. In the following 
paragraphs, the results of the focus groups show how ICE line employees, first line 
supervisors and second line managers perceived and understood ICE’s efforts in each of 
these strategic change areas.  
There were several themes contained in Chapter II, which could be used to form a 
successful strategy for change management. Some were theoretical, while others were 
more practical. Government publications, specifically by the GAO, analyzed private and 
public sector transformations and detailed key recommended practices for government 
entities to employ in order to bring a successful merger to fruition. Additionally, several 
examples were found in the literature review of organizations that failed at a 
transformation process. The lessons learned from these cases indicated that failure 
occurred because they did not empower employees through involvement in the process, 
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they lacked clear decisions and goals, executive management did not take an active 
leadership role, they did not have a solid communication plan, they lacked sufficient 
resources and they lacked the core competencies to execute change.  
Common themes taken from the literature concluded that among the several steps 
critical for a successful merger were a clearly stated mission and priorities, employee 
involvement, direct leadership’s involvement in driving the process through a dedicated 
team accountable for progress and well-planned and clearly delivered communications. A 
critical element found for transforming public service agencies and those organizations 
having different cultural values, was that slow, deliberate, timed steps were needed to 
insure that there were no lapses in organizational functionality.  
All participants in the focus groups, regardless of their legacy affiliation, strongly 
believed that ICE management failed to address the common themes found in the 
literature. Most of the participants had pent up frustrations over the merger process and 
its outcome. Since they had no involvement in the process and had no opportunity to 
formally express them to date, most participants had difficulty staying on topic and their 
comments typically exemplified this phenomenon. 
The participants believed that there was no employee involvement, no 
communication strategy, and no dedicated management team – in fact aside from one 
participant naming the head of the agency, no other participant was able to clearly name 
the individuals responsible for driving the process. There was poor leadership, no 
management accountability, no coherent mission, undefined then changing priorities and 
no strategy – which to this very day ICE does not possess. The merger was not 
adequately planned and it was not adequately funded. From a general observation on how 
the change management process unfolded in the eyes of ICE employees, every sin that 
could have been committed during the merger process by ICE leadership had been 
committed.  
B. AGENCY ISSUES 
This section provides a current snapshot of the focus group participant’s beliefs 
regarding a number of issues affecting ICE as an organization. They are Mission and 
Priorities, Resources and Type of Work and Agency Efficiency. 
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1. Mission and Priorities 
The research literature on change management clearly identifies a need to have a 
clear mission with established priorities and goals. GAO stated that one of the most 
significant challenges faced by INS, which has continued to haunt ICE, was a lack of a 
clear mission and clearly defined priorities and goals. Conner and Meyer provided 
empirical evidence pointing to the lack of clear decisions and goals as being one of four 
reasons that organizations fail to transform. 
Widespread among these focus group participants was an overarching belief that 
the organization’s mission is unclear and that the priorities change very frequently, but 
that the mission and priorities pertain in some manner to illegal aliens. A legacy Customs 
non-supervisor said, “ICE’s mission is officially to prevent the next terrorist act, but that 
is an oxymoron because we don’t investigate terrorism, it is in the sole jurisdiction of the 
FBI. Everything we do is for show, politics and press releases. Kiddie porn cases are 
done like fast food investigations so Assistant Secretary Myers can look like a deer in 
headlights at a press conference. We get notified that the President is going to do a press 
conference on a bunch of predators’ arrests and we had to have everyone arrested before 
the conference. The numbers are all inflated for show.” 
Another legacy Customs non-supervisor stated,  
The major priorities are worksite enforcement, fraud docs and human 
smuggling. Aliens are involved in everything we do. Ninety percent of the 
work during duty week is admin. Duty week is all about aliens and it takes 
a lot of time to clean up duty week when you go back to your regular 
group duties. 
Others found the priorities vague and constantly changing, but that they were also 
related to aliens. The consensus of the legacy INS non-supervisor group was that ICE had 
a general mission to protect the United States, but the mission was vague in specifics. 
One participant said, “it is not clear what the priorities are because they change 
continually. However, in general, the priorities pertain to the alien threat.” 
Notwithstanding a realization that ICE’s priorities somehow relate to an “alien threat” the 
participants believe that ICE is currently 60% as efficient as INS in performing 
immigration enforcement. 
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Not surprising, the legacy Customs supervisors believed that ICE’s core mission 
is illegal Aliens. As a participant said, “if a UDA is not attached, it won’t get worked. 
The public is being harmed by this policy. What’s more important, to arrest and remove 
an alien who’ll come back in the next day or work a case involving a company importing 
substandard bolts that’ll be used to build a bridge, or drug traffickers bringing in 30 tons 
of cocaine?” 
Another legacy Customs supervisor added, “we have just about closed down child 
exploitation. We now do reactive INS work. The long proactive cases are gone. When 
you call HQ they’ll only talk to you if it relates to an alien. During duty week, why aren’t 
there enough legacy INS to handle the UDA calls?” 
The legacy INS supervisors were in agreement that immigration issues were 
center stage, but said that the mission was unclear and priorities changed rapidly. One 
participant said, “there are no clear-cut goals, we are floundering. Clearly immigration is 
one of the bigger things now, dope is a big issue – it’s all politically driven.” Another 
participant said, “everything is a priority and nothing is coordinated at the HQ level 
before sending it to the field. Special projects come out frequently.” The participant noted 
that five special projects were currently in operation, which when mandated did not allow 
time for proper realignment of resources by field managers.  
Despite coming from different agencies, having vastly different years of 
experience, and holding distinct positions of authorities, all the participants including 
new hires agreed that there was no clear mission and priorities changed often. The new 
hires said that the mission was unclear and that priorities continue to change, but that the 
workload was 75% administrative and pertaining to undocumented or out-of-status 
aliens. 
2. Resources  
As various researchers have concluded, one of the main reasons that 
transformations fail is that the capacity for change was underestimated. The legacy 
Customs and new hire participants believed that ICE did not have the resources to be 
successful. The legacy INS participants believed that although additional resources could 
be used, they currently had more resources at their disposal then before.  
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The legacy Customs non-supervisors believed that there was less manpower and 
resources for legacy Customs groups. One participant noted that “pre-DHS, we needed 
more agents, nothing more. We had money. We had equipment. We had a better 
structure, we now have chaos. We used to be able to have long-term investigations, now 
we are reactive. We are now like fireman waiting for a fire to put out. Since DHS it is 
now beg, borrow, and steal.”  
The legacy Customs supervisors believed that ICE’s funding was insufficient. 
One participant in agreement with the perceptions of the legacy Customs non-supervisor 
group said, “we never had that problem [funding] in Customs. And we hate that Border 
Patrol takes from the asset forfeiture fund. Customs used to generate money. Immigration 
costs money. Now there is no funding for Customs operations. There is no money in 
immigration work, we get junk assets and we have to house aliens.” 
The new hire group’s perspective was slightly similar to the views expressed by 
the legacy Customs groups. A participant said, “in-house shared services with CIS to get 
A-files, personnel issues, working with Air and Marine are big problems.” In general, the 
group believed that the work was overwhelming for the resources present. Another 
participant said, “we are under-resourced and need more agents.” Specifically addressing 
DRO as a resource, one participant said, “as of late, DRO and OI’s relationship has 
gotten better, but still has a long way to go.” All of the groups except the legacy INS 
supervisors shared the belief that DRO was not a reliable resource for ICE.  
The legacy INS non-supervisors agreed with legacy Customs that Customs was 
better organized and had more resources than INS. They believe that ICE is better 
structured than INS and that resources are equitably provided to the field. In INS, getting 
resources was based more on personal relationships with INS HQ staff. Said one 
participant, “there are many things working better. We have more authorities like with 
seizures, better command structure, more defined articulated methods for budgeting and 
getting resources – we are more professional. Getting resources in INS was very 
informal, depending upon who you knew at HQ. ICE has more individuals in HQ than 
INS, responsible for specific areas. INS had one person to juggle 3 hats; we now have 
experts that go to specific programs. ICE has a better structure than INS.” 
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Similar to the new hires, the legacy INS non-supervisors believed shared services 
were somewhat of a problem. According to one participant’s statement, which received 
group consensus, “we no longer have full access and can’t get files or information 
contained in CIS or DRO maintained databases. CIS won’t recognize our 287G task force 
officers and won’t give them any information, saying that they are not DHS employees. 
We can’t work immigration enforcement cases without access to this info.” As a group 
they also believed that DRO was not responsive to OI’s needs. 
The legacy INS supervisors agreed with the legacy INS non-supervisors that 
resources were better now than they were with INS, particularly in Phoenix because 
operational commitments to Ice Storm forced the integration of INS and Customs 
resources. Also similar to the legacy INS non-supervisors, the supervisors believed some 
shared services, such as air support were problematic, but other resources were available. 
The legacy INS supervisors differed in view from all of the other groups in their belief 
that relationships with DRO were not an issue. As one supervisor said, “Phoenix is well 
known nationally as the 3 musketeers, 3 amigos – SAC, DRO and OPLA [legal 
counsel],99 they work as ICE and we are cooperating very well.” 
The difference of opinion on resources is understandable. Legacy Customs had a 
different mission than legacy INS. Customs generated much more money than INS by 
collecting duties and taxes. As an income producer, they were well funded. INS collected 
some user fees, but their efforts paled in comparison to Customs. INS agents were 
accustomed to working with minimal resources. The structure that Customs brought to 
ICE and ICE’s resources is an improvement from INS’ structure and resources.  
3. Type of Work and Agency Efficiency 
An organization’s efficiency results from the proper allocation of resources to 
address goals. GAO found that ICE had challenges in whom to coordinate with, when to 
coordinate, inadequately defined roles, poor organizational alignment, ineffective use of 
resources and a lack of adequate performance measures. The researchers concluded that 
an appropriate change model must be present for a successful transformation. This  
 
                                                 
99 “OPLA” means Office of Principal Legal Advisor.  OPLA provides legal advice, training and 
services to support Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
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change model must include interim, attainable goals that can be realized early on to 
demonstrate success. With early, demonstrable successes, change will gather momentum 
and drive a transformation.  
The legacy Customs non-supervisors believed that a lack of continuity with 
management was problematic. Said one participant, “some SACs booted out agencies, 
didn’t want to work with them and over time this deteriorated relationships. Management 
made decisions that prevented cooperation with investigations that would have benefited 
us and another agency. We were told – ‘we don’t do that anymore.’”  
The legacy Customs non-supervisors believed that management was not 
accountable to ICE HQ. Said one legacy Customs non-supervisor, “protocols and policies 
are made up on the fly and change at the whim of the manager. Three years after the 
merger and we still have no final policies, no new position descriptions. We went two 
years without ratings and we have unknown standards. They have violated OPM policies 
and nothing is done. Those nationwide protocols and policies that we do have are 
violated in favor of locally decreed ones.” 
Legacy INS non-supervisors believed there was poor organizational alignment to 
the work. One participant said, “the ICE SAC and management enforces Customs’ way 
of doing things, but neglects the immigration enforcement process. With Customs it is 
drugs, drugs, drugs, kiddie porn, strategic, drugs. HQ’s forcing immigration priorities, but 
SACS are fighting it. How do you account for 3 groups working drugs and one group 
working alien smuggling? This is the opposite of what it should be in the SAC offices 
according to what the Assistant Commissioner, the White House and ICE HQ says, but 
no one holds the SAC accountable. How is anything going to change?” 
Another legacy INS non-supervisor seconded this theme. He said, “the Table of 
Organization and Group Structures in the SAC offices must mirror the priorities and 
resources distributed as priorities dictate. Where is worksite enforcement? Where is 
human trafficking? The White House, DHS Secretary and Assistant Secretary have said 




group and 3 weed groups. I thought Assistant Secretary Garcia said we weren’t DEA. 
How can the SACS ignore HQ? No one has reorganized groups. We still have legacy 
Customs groups – 3 years after.” 
According to a legacy Customs supervisor, “a dime dope bag off the street is 
better than an INS case.” Another participant said, “we are doing terrible administrative 
cases. We have 8 groups. 1.5 groups do customs work and 6.5 groups are reactive to 
immigration work. We got the worst of both agencies. The scope of work - Customs and 
INS, is too much for 1 person.” 
The legacy Customs supervisors also believed that there were alignment issues 
with other DHS entities. One participant’s view, which was a consensus viewpoint 
between both legacy Customs groups, was that “Border Patrol should be subservient to 
OI. The design is flawed. There are no uniforms over detectives in the real world. OI 
should drive everything. Look who we have running BP – a guy with an associates 
degree. Every Customs agent is intellectually superior to him.” 
The legacy INS supervisors believed that much of the work done in the field is 
stove piped within divisions. A shared belief with the legacy INS non-supervisors was 
that offices staffed predominantly with legacy Customs, failed to re-align their staffs to 
HQ priorities and that the management was not accountable to HQ. One participant stated 
that “you have 30 ICE agents in Nogales. Three years into the merger and not a single 
one of them knows how to process, IDENT 100or ENFORCE101 an alien. They have 
maintained their Customs mission, priorities and direction. They had training but didn’t 
listen because they had no intention of ever doing immigration work and their managers 
weren’t going to make them. Same thing Douglas. And you call their managers in Tucson 
and they tell you have DRO bring them [UDAs] up to Tucson and give them to Group 5 – 
the 5 or 6 legacy immigration agents left in Tucson.” 
                                                 
100 “IDENT” means the Automated Biometric Identification System.  IDENT is a biometric 
identification system designed to quickly screen aliens using biometric or other unique identification data.  
IDENT was a legacy Immigration and Naturalizations Service system that was integrated with ENFORCE 
and is now used primarily by Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
101 “ENFORCE” means Enforcement Case Tracking System.  ENFORCE is an integrated event based 
tracking system that is used to track and manage enforcement cases, such as alien apprehensions. 
ENFORCE was a legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service system that is now used primarily by 
Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  
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The new hires said that not getting consistent answers to issues that arise are a 
large problem. One participant stated, “it depends if you ask a legacy INS or a legacy 
Customs person – that’s when you can get someone to answer you or give an opinion. No 
one wants to rock the boat. One supervisor tried to stand up and help us and he was shot 
down. He quit. We need trained supervisors. There is a lack of policy and bad 
management.” 
Lack of management accountability and poor office alignment to the priorities are 
serious issues and are two themes that resonated throughout the groups. First, was that 
management lacked accountability to ICE HQ. Second, was that there was poor 
organizational alignment to the work. While the groups agreed that there was a problem 
with organization alignment, their opinions differed why it was problematic. The legacy 
Customs participants believed that ICE de-emphasized traditional Customs-related work. 
The legacy INS participants believed that the field office had not aligned work groups to 
HQ dictated priorities and still maintained Customs-related work groups. Although the 
groups’ opinions differ, they are both accurate. The office is predominantly structured 
around a Customs mission, but much of the work being done is immigration enforcement 
related. This is not efficient and explains the observations by the legacy INS agents that 
ICE is 60% as efficient as INS in immigration enforcement.  
C. PERSONAL ISSUES 
This section provides information on issues of a more personal nature to the focus 
group participants. They are Stress and Tension and Self-Image and Morale. 
1. Stress and Tension 
The words stress and tension are at times used interchangeably; however, for 
purposes here, they refer to two different things. Workplace stress is produced by a 
number of issues and occurrences. The change management process in connection with a 
merger or transformation is a natural stressor. With change management comes fear of 
the new or unknown. Feelings of insecurity and vulnerability cause stress. Unclear or 
lack of communication, absence of leadership, an uncooperative atmosphere and general 
imbalance in the workplace cause stress. All of these types of stressors have an 
accumulative affect, which can manifest as tension in the workplace amongst employees 
and between employees and the agency. 
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The focus groups provided their reasons for the presence of tension. The most 
significant issue cited by three groups as causing interpersonal tension was the promotion 
of legacy INS agents. The merger of INS and Customs into ICE created pay parity 
discrepancies between legacy INS and legacy Customs agents. Journey agent grade at 
INS was GS-12, while journey grade at Customs was GS-13. To achieve pay parity, all 
ICE journey agents became GS-13s.  
The legacy Customs non-supervisors and supervisors alike shared great animosity 
and resentment towards legacy INS agents, who they believe were not entitled to pay 
grade increases. The perception was that legacy INS agents were educationally inferior to 
legacy Customs agents. Said one non-supervisor legacy Customs participant, “there is 
tremendous tension between legacy Customs and legacy INS agents. The work gets done, 
but morale is terrible. The tension has leveled off, but it is real. I resent that I had to go to 
college, and then I went to the academy, another opportunity to fail out of this job. And 
these guys had a magic wand waved over them and they’re 13s. They didn’t even have to 
go to CITP.102 My understanding is a GED was enough to be hired by INS, and here we 
are.” 
The legacy Customs supervisors agreed with the non-supervisors. One participant 
said, “the tension and morale problems are bad. You just can’t hold the INS agents 
accountable. Customs and INS had different work practices. You have one or two high 
performing legacy INS agents amid all high performing Customs agents. Legacy INS 
agents have a terrible work ethic and they got their 13s.” 
The legacy INS non-supervisors agreed with the legacy Customs groups about the 
cause of the tension. As one participant said, “we had no idea that there was such 
animosity and hatred of INS by Customs. I always viewed them as partners, but the 
feeling was not mutual. They have such an air of superiority. They were GS-13s, we were 
GS-12s. We are now told we were substandard and are substandard because we did not 
earn our grades.” The group believed that this source of tension could have been 
minimized by action prior to the merger. A participant stated, “the culture clash could 
                                                 
102 “CITP” means the Criminal Investigator Training Program.  CITP is a basic training program for 
criminal investigators at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center that many newly hired federal 
agents attend. 
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have been minimized if INS and Customs management was better integrated into ICE. It 
was all we heard, Customs, Customs, Customs. This worsened the culture clash. Where 
are the ADDIs103 in ICE management? ICE could have worked from inception if grade 
parity existed and INS management had equal footing with Customs management, but 
competitive INS managers were removed one way or another.” 
The legacy INS supervisors and new hires agreed that tension exists, but did not 
cite pay parity as the cause. Legacy INS supervisors believed that there was tension only 
because management tolerated it. According to one participant, tension is “very 
adversarial within OI. If we can learn to respect each other’s backgrounds then it is a 
positive meld. However, that respect must come from the top down. You can’t have 
legacy-addicted people in charge. The answer to their stubbornness shouldn’t be a 
reward.” 
The new hires had a unique perspective on this tension. From an outsider’s view 
as a new agent their indoctrination into ICE at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center (FLETC)104 was a prognostication of what they would later experience in the 
field. With group consensus present, one participant commented, “training at FLETC in 
2004 and 2005 was the same. In training, we had to sit around and listen to disgruntled 
legacy Custom agents bad mouth INS and everything that happened. We had all Customs 
instructors and they were not good role models. They complained that they were stuck 
there because of the merger and wanted to be transferred out. They haven’t mellowed out. 
There are 2 sides to the office.” 
It is clear that tension is present. However, why it exists to the extent it does, is 
the question. The merger is approaching the four-year anniversary date in March 2007 
and the pay parity issue in itself is believed to over-stated. The real culprit behind 
continuing tensions between legacy agents is a result of failed change management.  
                                                 
103 “ADDI” means Assistant District Director for Investigations.  The ADDI was the management 
position responsible for the Investigations Division. An ADDI was located at each of the 33 Immigration 
and Naturalization Service District Offices. 
104 The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is located in Glynco, Georgia.  FLETC provides all 
levels (basic to advanced) of law enforcement training to employees at more than 80 Federal agencies.  
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A failure of the merger plan to adequately address critical practices, which would 
have lessened stress, created a fertile environment for misplaced tension and hostility to 
grow. Current tension and hostility between legacy agents was caused by the failure to 
reduce stress during the merger and continues to present. If the legacy agents were vested 
in the merger process, the issues creating stress would have been mitigated and the 
current level of tension would be considerably less than exists today. The literature 
provides much better insight as to the reasons for the prevailing relationship between 
legacy components.  
Employing GAO’s key practices would have mitigated the issues that caused 
stress during the change management process. Fear of the unknown is diminished when a 
coherent mission, and clear principles and priorities are communicated to employees. 
Having top leadership driving the transformation through a dedicated team in a 
transparent manner serves as a calming influence during times of change. Involving 
employees in the transformation process and use of employee’s ideas would have 
deterred feelings of insecurity and vulnerability. GAO found that communicating and 
reinforcing the mission gave employees a sense of where the organization was going and 
facilitated them in finding their niches within the new organization.  
The researchers held that a permanent collaboration, such that is needed for a 
successful merger, involved a commitment to common goals. Commitment is more easily 
achieved when participants perceive that they have influence in goal setting or at least in 
the process of how goals are to be achieved. This means that employees need to be 
included in the change management process. 
2. Self-Image and Morale 
Self-Image as an ICE agent and employee morale are extremely low. Many 
participants were counting days to early retirement or actively seeking new employment. 
A significant number of legacy INS agents have already transferred to positions in DRO 
and a significant number of legacy Customs agents stated that they are looking for 
employment outside of ICE. 
A legacy Customs non-supervisor expressed concern over lack of a grievance 
process and no opportunities for transfers to other offices. Contrasting current conditions 
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in ICE to what conditions were at Customs, one participant said, “in Customs they were 
fair and you had opportunities. Now there is no grievance process. We are told there’s the 
door if you don’t like it.” During a group discussion of lower pay grade opportunities at 
other agencies, one participant quipped “I am not looking for light at the end of the 
tunnel. I am looking to get out of the tunnel.”  
In discussing professionalism, another legacy Customs non-supervisor advised, 
“management must lead by example and there is no professionalism at the management 
level. Management acts like it is a personal affront to want a TDY105 or transfer out of 
Phoenix. They say no one is leaving, but SACs themselves don’t stay. Management rules 
by intimidation and they are not accessible and there are no grievance procedures. Lower 
level management and supervision refuses to forward requests up through the chain of 
command and our local policy is different than HQ policy.” 
On professionalism and grievance procedures, a legacy INS non-supervisor again 
referenced accountability, a theme found in a prior section, when he said, “there needs to 
be accountability. Unprofessionalism cannot be tolerated. The buck has to stop at the 
SAC. There is too much unequal treatment of Customs versus Immigration. There is 
nowhere to forward complaints or suggestions to change things. The attitude needs to 
change from the top. From HQ to the SACS to the DSACS106 to the ASACS107 to 
GSs.108”  
The legacy INS participants said that they are continually demeaned when they 
hear legacy Customs agents refusing to perform INS enforcement work because it is not 
real criminal enforcement work. One legacy INS non-supervisor said, “we hear from the 
legacy Customs SAC, DSAC, ASAC level ‘we’ll be a lot better off when we get rid of 
this immigration shit,’ but they miscalculated how big an issue immigration is. Legacy 
                                                 
105 “TDY” means Temporary Duty.  TDY is typically a short-term reassignment away from an 
employee’s permanent duty station. 
106 “DSAC” means Deputy Special Agent In Charge.  A DSAC is typically a third line supervisor at 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
107 “ASAC” means Assistant Special Agent In Charge.  An ASAC is typically a second line 
supervisor at Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
108 “GS” without a dash and number (e.g. GS-1) means Group Supervisor.  A GS is typically a first 
line supervisor at Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  GS with a dash and number typically indicates a 
salary point on one type of Federal pay scale.  
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Customs says they cannot lower themselves to do immigration enforcement. Had we had 
an equal INS management footing with start up, we would not have as many problems 
now.” 
The legacy Customs supervisors believed that the work ICE does is degrading. 
Said one participant, “we are doing terrible administrative cases, which are reactive to 
immigration work.” Another participant expressed, “ICE must be a standalone agency, 
away from FPS109 and DRO.”  
The legacy INS supervisors expressed the same concern over the lack of respect 
that was expressed by the legacy INS non-supervisors. One participant stated, “we still 
feel like a stepchild. If people don’t respect what you do and treat you in a subordinate 
manner and you’re treated as a second-class agent, supervisor or manager because of 
your background, you’re diminished.”  
Non-supervisor groups and the new hires had consensus on the need for a 
grievance process. The theme of accountability again resurfaced as a new hire advised, 
“Assistant Secretary Myers signs policy memos and the SAC doesn’t follow them. This 
place is run by a culture of fear. There are no processes in place. There are no avenues for 
redress. Management won’t agree to meet with you. There is no accountability to HQ 
from the local offices.” A second participant offered, “we need to be our own entity and 
not defined by others. We need to be more like the FBI110, ATF111, and Secret Service. 
We need to market and forge an identity.” 
The groups were in consensus that self-image and morale were debilitating issues 
to the functioning of ICE and accountability was a prevalent theme. The lack of a 
grievance process was only cited as important by the non-supervisors and there were 
differences in the beliefs between legacy INS and legacy Customs agents. Both legacy 
INS non-supervisor and supervisor groups voiced a previously heard theme that 
explained morale issues – lack of respect from legacy Customs regarding immigration 
                                                 
109 “FPS” means Federal Protection Service.  FPS provides law enforcement and security service to 
Federally-owned and leased facilities.  FPS was a subcomponent of the General Services Administration 
and became one of the 22 agencies that merged to create the Department of Homeland Security.  FPS 
became a subcomponent of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
110 “FBI” means Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
111 “ATF” means Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 
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enforcement. Legacy Customs supervisors provided credibility to the legacy INS 
participant’s perceptions, when they said that immigration enforcement work is 
degrading.  
As observed by the new hires, ICE needs a new identity. Low self-image and poor 
morale are counterintuitive to forming a new culture and creating a new identity. A 
properly executed change management plan would have left the workforce with high self-
image and high morale. The researchers provided many steps that were integral to the 
process, which would have resulted in higher morale such as management accountability, 
listening to employee suggestions and communication. 
D.  SUMMARY 
A clearly defined mission, stable priorities, sufficient resources and proper 
organizational alignment to the priorities are important themes to successful change 
management. While stress and tension will be present during a merger, a properly 
developed and executed change management plan will mitigate the affects and develop a 
workforce with high self-image and high morale.  
The focus group participants believed that there was no defined mission or 
priorities; however, there were differences of opinion whether sufficient resources were 
present. Legacy Customs participants came from a revenue-generating agency that was 
able to provide adequate resources for a clearly defined mission. They along with the new 
hires did not believe that ICE had the necessary resources. Legacy INS participants came 
from an agency that was under-funded and under-staffed. Legacy INS participants found 
ICE to better organized with better resources than INS.  
There was one noticeable difference in the perceptions of in-house and shared 
services between legacy INS supervision and all other focus groups. While the legacy 
INS supervisors admitted to some shared services being problematic, they believed that 
there was a good working relationship with DRO. A possible explanation is that 
supervision is too far removed from working contact with DRO and therefore their 
perception is slanted by developed supervisor-to-supervisor relationships that are not 
mirrored at the working level. 
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The lack of accountability and poor organizational alignment were two themes 
that resonated with all groups. The legacy groups agreed that there was poor 
organizational alignment. Legacy Customs believed that Customs-related work was de-
emphasized in favor of immigration-related work. Legacy INS believed that the work 
groups were structured for a Customs mission, which sacrificed immigration work. Both 
groups were accurate in their perceptions. The office structure is predominantly 
structured to efficiently execute a customs enforcement mission, but the work is largely 
related to an immigration enforcement mission. This has resulted in ICE being 60% as 
efficient as INS in immigration enforcement. 
Three focus groups said that providing pay equity to legacy INS agents caused 
significant stress and tension. Both legacy Customs groups and legacy INS non-
supervisors believed this to be true. Legacy INS supervisors agreed that stress and tension 
were present, but for different reasons. The legacy INS supervisors believed that the issue 
was only present because management tolerated it and evidence offered by the new hires 
supported this belief. It is clear that stress and tension still exists. However, the merger 
occurred four years ago and the underlying cause for the current stress and tension stems 
from a faulty change management plan that exacerbated the issue. A properly executed 
plan would have included key practices such as involving employees in the process and a 
sound communication strategy, which would have mitigated stress and tension. 
Stress and tension affects self-image and morale and they are directly linked. All 
of the focus groups believed that self-image and morale were debilitating issues affecting 
ICE efficiency. The legacy INS participants believed stress and tension were caused by 
legacy Customs agents demonstrating contempt for immigration enforcement and 
showing disrespect for legacy INS agents. This in turn greatly lent to poor self-image and 
morale problems among legacy INS participants. Customs supervisors were alone in the 
belief that immigration work was demeaning and a cause of poor morale. All non-
supervisor groups believed that a lack of grievance procedures injured morale. As noted 
by the new hires, ICE needs a new identity and this can be done by creating a new 
culture. The themes found in the literature to increase morale were management 
accountability, listening to employee’s feedback and setting clear expectations – all 
issues raised by the focus groups.  
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V. MAKING MERGERS HAPPEN 
The previous chapter analyzed data from the focus groups against themes found in 
the literature to obtain a contemporary perspective of the merger outcome. This chapter 
uses the focus groups’ data to look back and specifically pinpoint what parts of the 
change management process failed. The literature’s important themes are still relied 
upon; however, this chapter is more retrospective in its analysis. An example of this can 
be found in examining accountability. Accountability was often mentioned in Chapter IV 
as a continuing issue of concern, affecting agency efficiency, organizational alignment, 
stress, tension, self-image and morale. In this chapter, accountability is discussed 
primarily in terms of the merger process.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Executing a merger is difficult in the best of situations. However, the merger of 
INS and Customs is not one of those situations. INS and Customs had different structures 
and two vastly different cultures were present. They each had immensely different 
missions, priorities, policies and procedures. Severe budgetary constraints posed 
enormous obstacles for the merger. Pay, grade and position inequities were present from 
journey level through senior executive leadership. Continuity of executive leadership was 
in doubt and that doubt continues as the agency head had been unable to secure senate 
confirmation. With these issues and more present, ICE should have followed a merger 
plan that addressed the critical issues identified by the researchers. GAO provided ICE 
with basic implementation practices identified for federal agency mergers and 
transformations, but they were ignored. 
Many practices identified by GAO are cross-referenced in the academic literature, 
such as top leadership driving the transformation through a dedicated management team 
that is held responsible for executing the plan through a performance management 
system. Researches cited the criticality of obtaining employee input, keeping employees 
informed by establishing a strong communications plan and the need for a coherent, 
clearly defined mission, with implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum 
and show progress. 
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How many of these critical practices did ICE employ in their merger execution 
plan? According to all of the focus groups, neither their legacy agencies nor ICE kept 
them informed about the merger, requested employee input or provided adequate training 
to agents for their positions as ICE Special Agents.  
B. COMMUNICATION 
A legacy Customs non-supervisor said, “we first heard of the merger when DOJ 
had a party – they were getting rid of INS, that’s how everyone found out. Rumors. 
Newspaper. Our SAC told us to freshen up our resumes.” Another participant stated, “the 
merger needed to have been planned out and not rushed to implement it. We needed to 
know where we were going and it needed to be phased in. All the things, still not working 
out 3 years later, should all have been worked out before it started and we should not 
have used a band-aid approach.”  
In agreement with the perception from the legacy Customs non-supervisor group, 
a legacy INS non-supervisor advised, “we heard of the merger through the news and 
rumors. The rumors were that we were being merged with FBI, Customs, DEA. There 
were no briefings, nothing formal, no official word through management. We thought to 
the end that there would be a Bureau of Immigration Enforcement.” 
A second legacy INS non-supervisor said, “the top on down failed to keep us 
informed. Why no e-mails or all hand’s meetings? We acknowledge that things were 
changing rapidly, but this just points to poor planning. The pace of change resulted in 
knee jerk reactions to unforeseen or unknown issues, which should have been known. 
The merger process was just too rushed and not thought out.” 
As the majority of ICE management came from legacy Customs, this issue raised 
the most ire with the legacy INS groups that had to quickly adapt to a Customs work 
environment. A third legacy Customs non-supervisor added to the discussion, “the 
administration and leadership should have better prepared in advance, not ‘okay you guys 
are together, where do we go now?’ This was a total lack of planning, too much reaction. 




policies, practices and procedures were developed, but that never happened. We were 
kept in the dark then slammed and held accountable for things we did not know about 
because they were all Customs.” 
The legacy INS supervisors knew a merger was occurring, but had no facts. As 
one legacy INS supervisor emphatically stated, “people are still just angry about the 
whole thing. It was shoved down people’s throats and that makes those working 
relationships that did exist, tough to recover. What we heard was through rumor, it’s 
going to happen, we don’t know what it’s going to look like, but it’s going to be a hostile 
takeover.” 
Echoing the other groups, the legacy Customs supervisors said information was 
scarce. One participant advised, “during the merger we heard nada. It wasn’t explained to 
us and we had no input. It was all rumors. We did have one SAC meeting in the 
beginning, after the merger was announced, but not much was said. No one knew 
anything.” 
Although both legacy groups were in agreement that there was at best poor 
communication concerning the merger, the legacy INS groups were the most vocal about 
the issue. Between legacy INS agents and legacy Customs agents, the INS agents were 
more affected by poor communication. The merger placed them in an unfamiliar 
organizational structure, managed by legacy Customs agents and responsible for legacy 
Customs policies, practices and procedures. An additional factor that elevated this issue 
for legacy INS participants is explained by the focus groups’ demographics.  
Comparing legacy group to legacy group, the former INS agents had 
approximately twice the length of experience with INS than the legacy Customs agents 
had with Customs – 21.5 years at INS to 9.6 years at Customs. Even more striking is the 
difference between legacy non-supervisor groups. The legacy INS non-supervisor 
participants average 15 years experience with INS, while the legacy Customs non-
supervisor participants averaged 2.9 years experience with Customs. The older, more 




C. LEADERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
The legacy Customs non-supervisors were the only group to name someone, at 
least by title, as being responsible for the merger, when one participant stated, “the 
Assistant Secretary drove the merger along with senior Customs’ management, who soon 
retired. The merger was driven by knee jerk.” There were no standards or policies in-
place to govern the process. Another participant advised that there was no accountability 
to HQ and that local management often made rules contrary to HQ. 
There was consensus in the legacy INS non-supervisor group that no one was 
really responsible for the merger. One participant said, “the Commissioner should have 
stood up for us at the merger, but he was not a real Commissioner. People at the top, the 
Executive Associate Commissioners - Policy and Planning, should have stood up, but 
they didn’t or how else would we have ended up with 3 out of 25 SACS.” Another 
participant advised, “the initial and continuing failure of this process belongs to HQ, from 
not planning to now not holding people accountable. It has partly shifted to the SACS, 
but HQ does not hold SACs accountable. HQs does not lead. They operate in a vacuum.” 
Another legacy INS non-supervisor agreed that no one was accountable and 
advised that “ICE needs an accountable group - outside those with operational duties, to 
focus on an integration plan, because it still hasn’t happened and it won’t. Someone needs 
power over the SACs to hold them accountable for achieving integration and it won’t be 
a legacy Customs person in OI.” 
The legacy Customs supervisors also could not name those responsible for 
implementing the merger plan. One participant said, “no one drove the merger process. 
There was no vision. No one had any business acumen.” 
As in the previous discussion on communication, one of the more disenfranchised 
groups was most expressive on this topic. A legacy INS supervisor said, “we don’t know 
who perpetrated this thing. There was a planning core, but we’re not sure exactly who 
that was. Who took these 22 entities and turn them into something else today? All a 
bunch of whiz kids. The faces kept changing. As it was happening, I was on a 4-month 
detail at HQ at the time. I remember all these kids coming in – they looked like my 
daughter, telling me about their view of the future.”  
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The research points to leadership and accountability being critical to a successful 
merger. Based upon the data obtained from the focus groups, it is unknown who led the 
merger process, whether a team or individual was responsible or whether there was even 
any accountability outside of ICE to achieve a successful merger. This could just be a 
further example of a failed communication plan. However, what is important for this 
thesis is that the participants perceived that the merger was done ad hoc, without 
forethought or consideration for the employees. 
D. EMPLOYEE INPUT AND FEEDBACK 
There was again complete consensus among the legacy groups that no employee 
input was sought and attempts at feedback were prevented. Researchers and government 
sources agreed on the necessity for employee involvement. Without involvement and 
employee buy-in to the process, employee commitment and a successful merger is 
doubtful. A legacy Customs non-supervisor advised, “at a town hall meeting the SAC 
encouraged people to come up. As agents started to come up, the acting DSAC said ‘sit 
down, you are not talking to him.’ We cannot get anything through the ASACs’ level.” 
Legacy INS non-supervisors advised that the culture clash could have been 
mitigated if legacy INS management was present with a voice during the merger. One 
participant advised, “more legacy INS management is needed so that immigration 
enforcement concerns have a voice. If immigration enforcement is not represented from 
the ground all the way up, its voice will be lost.” 
A legacy Customs supervisor said, “there was nothing that could have been done 
better other than doing it slower and more deliberate, with more input from agents. The 
corporate expertise was not used in creating ICE.” 
And again, legacy INS supervisors, arguably speaking for the most 
disenfranchised group at ICE provided the strongest opinions on this issue. One 
participant commenting on who drove the merger said, “no one with any institutional 
knowledge; it was like they avoided talking with anyone with institutional knowledge 




in.” A second participant added, “truth is if they spoke to us with our institutional 
knowledge we could have come up with some of the more creative, positive ways for it to 
happen. There are still wounds from the method in which it occurred.”  
E. TRAINING 
In general, training is important to federal law enforcement agents; however, the 
training required for this merger was beyond critical. Whether training is used as a 
process or step in organizational change or as a significant change agent itself, a trained 
workforce is an inherent element for any successful merger or transform.  
The non-supervisor and new hire groups were more vocal on this issue than the 
supervisor groups. This is not a surprise as they are responsible for work production in 
the field. However, there was consensus from all groups, including supervisors and new 
hires, that training was woefully insufficient. A second consensus of all the groups was 
that Spanish language instruction still needed to be widely instituted.  
A legacy Customs non-supervisor said, “and to give 24 to 32 hours training - no 
other agency would do that and allow you, no expect you to enforce new law. You took 
an open book test and they pushed a button and said ‘You have the authority to enforce 
federal immigration law.’ Totally ludicrous. No questions were allowed in class. We 
were told by instructors, ‘I’ll give you the answers you’ll need for the test.’ Fraud 
document training was some 1972 visa on 2 power point slides. The instructor walked 
around during the test and would point out ‘I think that is the correct answer’ on the test 
form. It was all a dog and pony show – ‘We gave you your training.’ We look like idiots 
in front of people while we wait for a legacy immigration agent to show up. Three years 
later I am still calling people for help to answer questions or to interpret. It is the same for 
the INS agents – they are in a trick bag too.” 
A legacy INS non-supervisor advised, “the new hires complain about the training 
they received and lack of Spanish language training. You cannot do immigration 
enforcement without speaking Spanish and it was a big mistake dropping it as a 
requirement, but it shows you the direction ICE wants to go. And the lack of a post 
academy training program and a mentoring program is also a mistake.” A second 
participant said, “no one is learning ENFORCE. Less than half of legacy Customs can 
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even access it. Even in-service training is legacy Customs related. Have you ever heard of  
an in-service on human trafficking?” A third participant said, “FLETC training must 
reflect ICE priorities: ASU112, Worksite, Fraud and in-service training must reflect ICE’s 
priorities. We need formal post academy.” 
As previously referenced under tension, part of the new hire’s advisement is 
apropos here: “training at FLETC in 2004 and 2005 was the same. In training, we had to 
sit around and listen to disgruntled legacy Custom agents bad mouth INS and everything 
that happened. FLETC was like two watered down academies. We had all Customs 
instructors and they were not good role models. They complained that they were stuck 
there because of the merger and wanted to be transferred out.” 
Despite differences in background, experience, education and training, the 
participants voiced concerns over the poor quality of in-service and basic academy 
training. Senior agents stated that they were often embarrassed in the field before other 
law enforcement officers because they do not know the laws they were charged with 
enforcing. Many participants voiced an inability to effectively perform their jobs, which 
negatively affects other issues such as self-image and morale.  
F. SUMMARY 
It is clear that key practices discussed in the literature were not applied to the 
change management plan executed by ICE. INS and Customs leadership failed their 
employees. They did not prepare them for the merger, let alone include them in the 
merger planning process. This failure of leadership continued with ICE leadership. ICE 
failed miserably to develop and execute a change management plan and ICE employees 
continue to suffer the consequences.  
There is strongly voiced consensus among the groups that employees had no input 
in the creation of ICE. The rumor mill was the only source of communication affecting 
their professional lives. Someone evidently made decisions during the merger; however, 
it was not a transparent process to the focus groups’ participants. The participants 
perceived that there was no accountability for the process or to employee’s needs. 
Training was at best an after-thought to the merger, not a component or driving force. In-
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service training was a sham and academy training is woefully inadequate. However, 
perhaps the most important dimension to the failure was the lack of employee 
involvement to the process. Employee buy-in was not sought and in fact it was 
discouraged. The inattention to this critical issue could possibly have sown the seeds for 
non-success more so than any other issue. All of the groups expressed resentment over 
not being included in the process. 
Unfortunately, with leaderships’ performance and a failed merger, there is little 
wonder why ICE does not have its own culture or identity, but remains mired and 
stagnated in a convolution of identities and cultures brought over from INS and Customs. 
What can be done? Is it too late to recover? What changes might be done to rectify the 
earlier mistakes? If not, and the leadership at the Department level, or the White House, 
or Congress decided to try again, what would these results from the employees suggest 
for the new initiative? 
The final chapter makes a strategic recommendation to mitigate the damage from 
this failure. Additionally, a pilot program is proposed for ICE in Phoenix, Arizona. The 
pilot program leverages stakeholders’ support in an effort that will reduce tensions 





The recommendations are divided into two primary sections. The first section 
makes a global strategy recommendation for addressing ICE’s challenges. The second 
section describes a pilot program for ICE to transact in Phoenix, Arizona. 
ICE was one of the unique entities created by the standup of DHS. It was formed 
by merging various components taken from pre-existing organizations. This provided 
ICE with a uniquely different role, having a much broader application of authorities than 
held by any of the pre-DHS component agencies. However, according to independent 
observers and, as this thesis documents, the views of employees from both legacy 
agencies and across supervisory and non-supervisory roles, ICE has not been able to 
efficiently utilize these authorities because of a failed change management process that 
did not create a unified agency and continues to function along stove-piped functional 
lines.  
B. GLOBAL STRATEGY RECOMMENDATION 
ICE has only one strategic option to recover from the failure of the change 
management process used to merge INS and Customs. Because of the very poorly 
executed merger plan, tension and conflict in ICE is so bad that nothing short of a well-
planned and well-executed transformation plan will help. Without this, the damage to 
employee relations will take several generations of employees to correct by any measure 
short of a total transformation – and the country can ill afford that. The agency’s 
efficiency is severely degraded by the current conditions the merger has wrought. 
The focus groups identified a myriad of serious issues that will not respond to a 
quick fix and they are too plentiful to be corrected by anything less than a complete 
transformation process. The primary issues that found major consensus among the focus 
groups’ participants revolved around mission and priorities, organizational alignment, 
leadership, accountability, employee input, training and communication. Other more 
personal issues such as stress, tension, self-image and morale were also of great concern 
to the participants. However, the participants’ stress and tension, poor self-image and low 
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morale resulted from the primary issues that are still unresolved from the merger. 
Therefore, when the primary issues are properly addressed in a transformation plan the 
participants’ stress and tension will be reduced and their self-image and morale increased. 
The focus groups said that ICE’s mission was unclear and the priorities changed 
often. There was a belief that the mission focused around aliens, but that the 
organizational alignment of the workgroups did not support immigration enforcement. 
Not having a clear mission and focused priorities is unfair to the labor force and to the 
American people, yet it is understandable why ICE remains stovepiped along former 
Customs-oriented workgroups.  
At ICE HQ, the Deputy Secretary, Chief of Staff, Director of Investigations and 
every Deputy Assistant Director (e.g. those responsible for National Security, Smuggling, 
Financial, Narcotics, etc.) were all legacy Customs managers. In the field, legacy 
Customs managers held three out of twenty-five Special Agent In Charge positions. It is 
not difficult to understand why legacy Customs managers were chosen to run ICE when 
HQ leadership was comprised of virtually all legacy Customs managers. However, 40 
percent of ICE’s Special Agents were legacy INS Special Agents and that was a 
sufficient workforce to have properly aligned field units working towards the national 
priorities. Therefore, to increase agency efficiency, work units must be aligned to support 
the mission and the priorities – whatever they may be. 
Leadership was typically not visible or accessible during the merger, nor is it at 
present. Not wanting to make mistakes and injure promotional opportunities, supervision 
and mid-management would be reluctant to make any decisions. Supervision must be 
empowered to make decisions without fear of retribution for innocent mistakes. As 
previously quoted from Robert Behn’s The Dilemmas of Innovation in American 
Government, “the dirty little secret is that innovation requires failure. The corollary is 
that unless an organization tolerates… failure, it is unlikely to get much innovation.”113 
Supervisors must be allowed to make honest mistakes.  
This does not mean that management should not be held accountable for 
performance and compliance with HQ directed policies; it means that some latitude must 
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be provided. This is especially true when there is a predominantly legacy Customs 
management structure trying to supervise legacy INS agents executing an immigration 
enforcement mission. Without management possessing the institutional knowledge to 
implement an immigration enforcement mission, mistakes are inevitable. That said, upper 
field management should be held accountable for making decisions and instituting 
policies in clear contradiction to ICE HQ policy. As voiced by the focus groups, 
managers were not held accountable for their actions when they contradicted HQ.  
During the transformation, leadership must be visible and accessible. There must 
be a management team responsible for implementing the transformational plan and they 
must be held accountable for its proper execution. ICE employees must have input in the 
transformation process. There needs to be as much effort expended by the planning phase 
as there is used in the execution phase of a transformation. During the merger, the focus 
group participants said that they had no input in the merger and that they were silenced 
when they attempted to raise issues. They decried not having avenues for redress when 
management made decisions contrary to ICE policy and they were not permitted to speak 
to senior management. 
The participants also advised that they did not possess the skills to perform their 
job. For both new hires and journey agents, training was woefully insufficient. There was 
no communication plan during the merger. Rampant rumors had a debilitating affect on 
morale and work performance. While communication has improved slightly, it still 
mainly occurs as agency-wide e-mail broadcasts with no involvement of local 
management.  
In order to assist with a visualization of ICE’s current status, a strategy canvas 
(Figure 2) was used as an action framework and diagnostic tool to sort and clarify the 
scope of the issues facing ICE, compared to the issues that Customs and INS had faced. 
For purposes of this thesis, the major difference between a merger and transformation is 
that a merger is external. It constitutes two different, separate entities coming together to 
form a new organization. A transformation is an internal process, whereby an entity 
attempts to re-invent, change direction or in some manner improve itself. INS and  
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Customs merged, albeit not successfully. What needs done now is internal; a well-
planned and well-executed transformation plan to alleviate many of the focus groups’ 
major issues of concern:  
¾ Mission 
¾ Priorities 





















Figure 2.   Strategy Canvas: Issues of Concern for ICE Agents 
 (After W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne).114 
 
These items as noted on the horizontal axis capture those items of importance to 
ICE employees. The items are evaluated from the perspective of their legacy agency. The 
vertical axis rating was based upon an analysis of data collected during the focus group 
meetings. It represents a subjective quality evaluation by the participating employees of 
                                                 
114 W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press, 2005): 26. 
71 
the identified items of importance. In most areas, the higher the ranking, the more 
desirable the attribute. The one exception to this is “tension.” Tension is not normally a 
desirable attribute and an agency exemplifying high tension is worse than an agency with 
little tension. 
The vertical axis rating for Customs was an evaluation provided by legacy 
Customs agents. The vertical axis rating for INS was an evaluation provided by legacy 
INS agents. The vertical axis rating for ICE was an amalgamation of all legacy employee 
groups and the new ICE employee group. The importance of the strategy canvas is that it 
clearly demonstrates the areas that are in most need of redress: efficiency, employee 
input, tension, self-image/identity and morale.  
Mission and priorities did not score at the very bottom, but it is inconceivable for 
an agency not to have a clearly stated vision, mission and set of stable and achievable 
priorities. On this subject, ICE needs a Strategic Plan; a five year high-level road map, 
with strategic goals and objective that address ICE’s mission. While correcting these 
deficiencies – mission and priorities - alone would have some impact on agency 
efficiency it would not have an impact on the remaining issues.  
Customs scored higher or the same in all items of importance when compared to 
INS. Both legacy groups judged their work as equally important and both judged tension 
within their legacy agencies as low. In no area did ICE show an improvement over 
Customs. Both Customs and ICE did show an improvement over INS in resources. 
Returning back to those critical areas needing attention: efficiency, employee 
input, tension, self-image/identity and morale. Efficiency per se is not something you 
address head-on, but typically it can be the outcome of a strategy. Clarifying the mission 
and priorities will affect efficiency, but would have a minimal effect. The fact that ICE’s 
employees have concerns about the agency’s efficiency is very revealing and 
demonstrates their cognitive breakthrough and understanding that a transformation is 
needed.  
Employee input is very desirable, not only from the view of organizational change 
process per se; we see its importance in the literature as a change agent itself – if there is 
a framework for innovation feedback.  
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In ICE, tension was built in from the very start by merging such disparate 
agencies. According to the Government Accounting Office: 
The integration of INS and Customs investigators into a single 
investigative program has involved blending of two vastly different 
workforces, each with its own culture, polices, procedures, and mission 
priorities. Both programs were in agencies with dual missions that prior to 
the merger had differences in investigative priorities. For example, INS 
primarily looked for illegal aliens and Customs primarily looked for illegal 
drugs.115 
This tension is the outcome of self-image, identity and morale issues allowed to 
fester. Self-image, identity and morale form a powerful convergence that unduly 
influences tension and negatively affects agency efficiency. As observed in Chapters IV 
and V, change management processes that include the important aspects of employee 
input and empowerment will mitigate these issues.  
Notwithstanding GAO’s observations, with the employee’s cognitive 
breakthrough and dissatisfaction with the current status quo, the timing is perfect to 
undergo a strategic transformation by implementing a proper change management plan. 
Once a plan is executed the result will be an efficient, effective organization having a 
unified workforce with agents proud of their new identity, as ICE Special Agents. 
As part of a transformation plan, the training program needs to be totally re-
designed. Not providing agents with the proper training to perform their jobs is a recipe 
for failure. The current academy and in-service training is inefficient and ineffective. It is 
unfair and unconscionable not to provide a proper training environment with full skill 
sets being taught to new employees. According to the focus groups, the training that was 
provided to professional federal investigators was a sham and an embarrassment to the 
employee as well as to ICE. During any future in-service training, innovation feedback 
should be utilized by the agency to identify issues confronting the transformation. 
Additionally, ICE must ensure that know-how is demonstrated on learned skills. If not, 
whatever is spent on training will be misspent funds. 
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C. SUMMARY 
In general, the purpose of the thesis was to examine the source of ICE’s problems. 
The primary hypothesis was that ICE failed the change management process. ICE is not a 
successful merger of INS and Customs. ICE is an inefficient agency without its own 
culture. The organization is stagnated in a convolution of identities and cultures brought 
over from INS and Customs.  
The literature identified the crucial practices needed to successfully merge or 
transform an organization. The research provided the empirical evidence that the outcome 
of the change management process was failure. The analysis of the research against the 
themes found in the literature provided a snapshot of ICE’s current deficiencies as well as 
providing references to where the change management had failed. These failures must be 
addressed by a transformation. 
The outcome of the thesis is a recommendation to correct the failed merger. 
Nothing short of a well-planned and well-executed transformation plan will suffice and 
that is the recommendation. It is not within the scope of this thesis to draw a 
transformation plan. That is up to ICE leadership. The leadership must assess its own 
capacity to develop and execute a plan. The focus group participants questioned whether 
senior leadership had the in-house business acumen needed to develop and implement a 
merger plan. If the expertise does not exist within ICE to develop and execute a 
transformation plan, that expertise must be brought in.  
It will take time to develop and execute a transformation. In the mean time, a pilot 
program is suggested for Arizona. Why Arizona? For some of the same reasons it was 
chosen for the site of the focus groups. Arizona is a gateway state for alien entry into the 
United States and is the linchpin along the southern border that presents an enormous 
vulnerability to the United States for problems of an immigration enforcement nature. It 
is much publicized in the media that ICE and the state and local authorities have a poor 
relationship that can only be improved upon. ICE’s internal problems in Arizona are well 




retain senior management. No other ICE office in the country has experienced the 
succession of leadership as Arizona. However, most importantly is that ICE agents 
realize there is a need for a change. 
D. ARIZONA PILOT PROJECT 
This pilot program effectively uses immigration enforcement as a tool to leverage 
stakeholders’ support for a primary affect on morale and self-image/identity. This will 
then have a cascading affect on several more issues of relevance to ICE employees, such 
as mitigating staff losses, reducing tension, increasing resources, and eventually 
increasing agency efficiency.  
Through this program ICE will capitalize on the relationships local officials have 
with the media. ICE will do this by working with stakeholders, not against them. Good 
results bring good press and good press brings attention and additional resources. In this 
process, success feeds on and fuels further success. 
A SWOT/SWOC116 analysis completed on the ICE office in Phoenix, Arizona, 
revealed that it has the necessary elements and capacity to execute this pilot program. 
There is still a trained, experienced and capable staff; and opportunity is present because 
of a broad-base of stakeholders with immigration-related concerns.  
ICE’s resources and strengths will be utilized for this pilot program, which will 
have outputs and outcomes capitalized by stakeholders’ support of a proactive and visible 
immigration enforcement strategy. However, there is a threat and weakness to the 
program. Because of poor morale and other issues, there has been a large exodus of 
trained and experienced agents in immigration enforcement from OI, the ranks of which 
cannot been backfilled. With this cadre of experts to carryout the plan dwindling, 
execution should begin soon.  
There are four hurdles for this pilot program to clear in order to be successful: 
cognitive, limited resources, motivation and politics. Returning to the use of a strategy 
canvas (Figure 3) is helpful to visualize the current state of ICE with regard to these 
impediments. The result of data collected from ICE personnel indicates that there is 
                                                 
116 “SWOT/SWOC” means Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats/Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, Constraints. 
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already a high cognitive breakthrough indicating the need for ICE to undergo a strategic 
transformation. Limited resources are a concern for ICE and while congress has increased 
their budget and given ICE additional positions, it takes time for the government to hire 
and train new agents. What is important for the realization of this pilot program appeared 
on the Organizational Report Card Strategy Canvas. Whereas ICE’s resources are less 
than that of Customs, they are more abundant than what INS possessed. Since this plan 
involves primarily legacy INS agents who are used to working with minimal resources, 
ICE’s current resources are not too much of a hindrance to the proposed program’s 
success. 
 
Figure 3.   Strategy Canvas: Arizona Pilot Project’s Hurdles. 
 (After W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne).117 
 
Motivating agents to take on what appears to be another priority when they are 
already over-burdened will be difficult, but can be overcome. The focus groups 
                                                 







Hurdles to Pilot Project Execution
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demonstrated that there are sufficient numbers of motivated agents to drive this plan and 
early on successes will gain converts from those wanting change, but fearful to act.  
A key factor for the pilot project is that although politics or stakeholders’ support 
is low, with identification and support of common initiatives it will be the keystone to 
motivate staff and raise resources. This is similar to the phenomena of how self-image, 
identity and morale formed a convergence affecting several critical elements. 
Within the Arizona SAC area of responsibility, the pilot program will be executed 
in Phoenix, Arizona, for several reasons. Immigration enforcement issues are endemic to 
the area. Arizona is the gateway for illegal immigration into the United States from 
Mexico and Central America. Phoenix is the crossroads for the movement of illegal 
aliens throughout the United States. There is an abundance of stakeholders. 
The Phoenix Deputy Special Agent In Charge (DSAC) and two legacy INS agents 
will drive the plan. This is a critical component to the pilot project’s outcome; the 
employees driving the plan will be empowered to develop the pilot program. One agent 
needs to be an Assistant Special Agent In Charge (ASAC) and the other a Group 
Supervisor (GS). As the DSAC is upper management with farther reaching 
responsibilities than one enforcement program, there will be heavy reliance upon the 
ASAC. ASACs are the interpreters and communicators for the organization to the first 
line supervisors and agents. A GS is too close to the work to maintain an overall 
perspective, therefore an ASAC will have operational command and control for the 
program. The ASAC must be a skilled communicator and consensus builder. The ASAC 
used in this pilot program must have the requisite skills and experience to fill the position 
or the pilot program will fail. 
The pilot program will develop around an immigration enforcement issue on 
which ICE and stakeholders can cooperate. Frank conversations between state and local 
government and ICE will determine the enforcement area and define expectations. 
Typically human trafficking and alien smuggling, exploitation of workers, document 
fraud and identity theft, response to local police calls for assistance and hostage-taking 
are high on the list of ICE and stakeholders’ concerns. 
77 
Through frank conversations and transparency, state and local officials will not be 
unreasonable in their expectations of ICE. The pilot program agreement between ICE and 
stakeholders may limit ICE’s involvement in some local issues while expanding it in 
others. Just like the key practice of involving employees to obtain their ideas and their 
ownership for an agency transformation, this strategy looks to involve stakeholders as 
allies, to gain from their ideas and let them have ownership in solving an issue of concern 
to them as well as to ICE. 
The pilot program will succeed because there is a core desire among agents and 
stakeholders for success. Early on success will bring satisfaction to participating agents 
and stakeholders. As ICE Phoenix realizes successes from the pilot program and receives 
favorable stakeholder and media support, more resources will be forthcoming, morale 
will improve and turnover will decrease. With sufficient resources present, those agents 
that choose to specialize in other lines of ICE enforcement work will be more able to do 
so with the realization that it was immigration enforcement that brought their desires to 
fulfillment. As an outcome, respect for those operating in the realm of immigration 
enforcement will be earned and the much publicized tension between legacy INS and 
legacy Customs agents will lessen and the creation of a common identity will begin. 
Kim and Mauborgne’s Four Actions Framework (Figure 5) has been adapted for 
visualization of the pilot project’s outcome on ICE staff. Tension between legacy INS 
and legacy Customs agents will be eliminated. Cooperation between legacy INS and 
legacy Customs agents will be created. Morale will be raised and employee losses 




Figure 4.   Four Actions Framework: Arizona Pilot Project Outcome.118 
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